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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of reputation/feedback systems on the operation
of online credit markets using data from Prosper.com. The ability of lenders to re-
cover their loans is one of the main concerns in these markets, where the problems
of asymmetric information are two-fold. On the one hand, borrowers differ in their
inherent risks; on the other hand, additional incentives are necessary to motivate bor-
rowers to exert effort. In this paper, I investigate the channels through which repu-
tation/feedback systems improve the total welfare of market participants when both
adverse selection and moral hazard are present. A finite-horizon dynamic model of a
credit market in which borrowers and lenders interact repeatedly over time is developed
and then estimated. I prove the identification of the distribution of borrowers’ private
types and utility primitives based on variations in borrowers’ repayment histories, tran-
sitions of their characteristics, and interest rates. In the counterfactual analysis, I find
that 22 percent of welfare loss from asymmetric information is due to adverse selec-
tion, while 78 percent is due to moral hazard. Furthermore, I find that 95 percent
of the inefficiency induced by asymmetric information is eliminated by the reputation
system. I consider a policy intervention that protects borrowers from accidental loss
of reputation. My results suggest that incorporating a payment protection insurance
into the market further improves total welfare.
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1 Introduction
Online credit markets for peer-to-peer lending have developed rapidly over the last several
years.1 These markets attract dispersed and anonymous borrowers and often require no
collateral. The ability of lenders to recover their loan amounts is one of the main concerns
in markets of unsecured loans, where the problems of asymmetric information are two-fold.
On the one hand, borrowers differ in their inherent risk, which is hidden information; on
the other hand, borrowers’ actions are hidden as well, so additional incentives are necessary
to motivate them to exert effort to repay debts. Most online credit markets rely on a
“reputation/feedback” system which computes and publishes “reputation scores” based on
past outcomes to facilitate transactions.2 While the effect of reputation/feedback systems
is well-known in theory, there is very little empirical work on the extent to which and the
channels through which reputation systems improve the total welfare of market participants.3
Answers to these questions shed light on optimal mechanism design and regulations not only
for fast-growing online marketplaces, but also for traditional credit markets, and thus have
become increasingly important.
This paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to quantify the extent to which
reputation/feedback systems improve the total welfare of market participants when both
hidden information (adverse selection) and hidden actions (moral hazard) are present. I
develop and estimate a finite-horizon dynamic model of a credit market in which borrowers
and lenders interact repeatedly over time. I prove the identification of the distribution of
borrowers’ private types and utility primitives based on variations in borrowers’ repayment
histories, transitions of their characteristics, and interest rates. My results confirm three
important channels through which the welfare is improved by the reputation system. I also
provide quantitative results on the welfare loss from adverse selection and moral hazard
separately, and I find that moral hazard plays an important role in online credit markets.
In this paper, I use a large transaction-level dataset from Prosper.com. This website is
one of the leading peer-to-peer lending marketplaces in the US and provides services that
match lenders with borrowers.4 It collects information on borrowers’ credit profiles and loan
histories and decides on interest rates accordingly. My analysis benefits from the setting
of Prosper in the following ways. First, the reputation/feedback system in this market is
representative of that in other peer-to-peer websites. It provides clear reputational incentives
1See the trend of growth in Figure 3.
2For reviews of reputation/feedback systems in online markets, see Einav et al (2015) and Tadelis (2016).
3There is a large theoretical literature on the qualitative effect of reputation systems; see Akerlof (1970),
Holmstrom (1999), Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008), Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), Diamond (1989).
4Prosper now has more than two million registered members and has helped facilitate over nine billion
dollars in loans over the past ten years.
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through history-dependent pricing schemes. Second, “reputation scores” (credit grades) and
past outcomes (whether defaults or late payments occur) on this website are more objective
compared to customer reviews or individual rating scores based on the quality of goods or
services.5 Third, the website keeps track of all borrowers’ proposed listings with borrowers’
detailed characteristics and the outcomes of each loan for a relatively long time. Thus, I am
able to observe repeated borrowing patterns and how a borrower’s reputation is updated over
time. In addition, Prosper prohibits once-defaulted borrowers from future credit access. The
incentive effects of terminations discussed in the work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) strengthen
the role of the reputation/feedback system in my analysis.
In order to see whether reputational incentives impact borrowers’ behavior and market
outcomes, I begin my analysis by focusing on a group of borrowers who have two overlapping
loans. I arrange the loans for each borrower based on their closing dates and obtain two
results from regression analysis using this sample. First, I find that borrowers who default
on the first-closed loans are more likely to default on the second-closed loans. There are two
possible explanations for this finding: (1) once they default on one loan, borrowers know that
they are not allowed to enter again, and thus lose the reputational incentives of paying off the
existing loans; or (2) borrowers’ unobserved types create positive correlation between defaults
on the two loans. If only the second channel matters, we would expect that the default rates
for the first- and the second-closed loans are the same, since the pool of borrowers remains
unchanged. However, I further find that the second-closed loans have a significantly higher
default rate compared to the first-closed loans controlling for observables. This confirms the
importance of the first channel. In other words, borrowers respond to reputational incentives.
When incentives are reduced, default rates significantly increase.
Given the empirical evidence, I develop a finite-horizon dynamic structural model to
analyze borrowers’ repayment decisions, lenders’ funding strategies, and websites’ pricing
schemes under asymmetric information in online credit markets. In the model, borrowers are
heterogeneous in default cost, which constitutes their private type. For each loan, borrowers
choose effort levels after observing interest rates assigned by the website and shocks to
the cost of effort. The outcomes of each loan are stochastically affected by effort levels.
If expected payoffs from participation exceed outside option draws, borrowers stay in the
market. On the supply side, lenders make funding decisions after observing borrowers’
participation. Lenders’ payoff from a project depends on the borrower’s type and the effort
exerted. Lenders’ decisions are thus impacted by their beliefs about the borrower’s type.
The website charges commission fees for each funded loan.
5Customer review systems are widely adopted by e-commerce platforms such as eBay and Amazon.
Other peer-to-peer markets that use individual rating systems include Uber and Airbnb.
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While the existing literature on empirical contract models of credit markets mainly fo-
cuses on adverse selection in a static environment (see Einav et al, 2012 and Kawai et al,
2016), my paper combines adverse selection and moral hazard in a dynamic setting. Asym-
metric information enters my model through two channels. First, lenders and the website
do not observe borrowers’ true types. Borrowers with the same observables are charged the
same interest rates, which means that “lemon” borrowers are more likely to participate. This
is the effect of adverse selection. Second, borrowers’ effort levels are also unobserved. In my
model, the impact of moral hazard is multi-layered. For one, lenders face a trade-off between
interest rates and default probabilities. When interest rates increase, borrowers exert less
effort. Furthermore, borrowers’ effort choices interact with lenders’ beliefs in the dynamic
setting.6 In equilibrium, borrowers’ strategies need to be consistent with lenders’ updated
beliefs about borrowers’ true types.
In terms of identification, the key primitive of the model is the joint distribution of
the borrower’s type and the unobserved part of his/her cost of effort. A borrower’s type is
persistent, while costs of effort are drawn for each loan. To disentangle these two unobserved
sources, I first exploit variations across different loans. Following the literature that deals
with unobserved heterogeneity in dynamic models (see Hu and Shum, 2012), I use transitions
of state variables across loans to pin down the type distribution for borrowers who appear
multiple times.7 I then exploit variations within a loan. Borrowers’ participation, default
and late payment performances are independent conditional on effort levels. With these
three pieces of information, I recover the distribution of costs of effort conditional on each
type following the measurement error literature (see Hu, 2008; Hu and Schennach, 2008).
I further identify utility parameters in borrowers’ payoff functions and the outside option
distributions for borrowers and lenders using variations in interest rates. In the last step,
given other primitives that have been recovered, I identify the original type distribution for
all borrowers before any selection occurs.
Directly following my identification results, I apply the likelihood-based estimation strat-
egy to a large transaction-level dataset from Prosper.com. My estimation results indicate
that borrowers who have high credit grades and who use loans for debt consolidation are
more likely to be “good borrowers”. In addition, borrowers with higher default costs and
smaller loan requests are more likely to draw smaller costs of effort. As for the state tran-
sition process, I find high debt-to-income ratios are persistent, while the transition process
6On the one hand, lenders’ different future beliefs about the borrower’s type lead to different continuation
values for borrowers, thus affecting their effort choices. On the other hand, future beliefs are determined by
borrowers’ effort through the Bayesian updating process.
7For borrowers who have multiple loans, they must have no defaults in their previous loans. Thus, this
is a selected sample.
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is type-specific – borrowers who have high default costs are more likely to stay with low
debt-to-income ratios.
Using the structural estimates, I conduct counterfactual experiments consisting of three
parts. I first compare welfare under three information structures – one with types and
effort observed (symmetric information), one with only types observed, and one with both
unobserved. This experiment indicates that 22 percent of inefficiency from asymmetric
information is due to adverse selection and 78 percent is due to moral hazard. Furthermore,
I quantify the value of reputation and find that the reputation system recovers 95 percent
of welfare loss from asymmetric information through three important channels. First, the
reputation system helps to refine beliefs about the underlying risks of borrowers, so that
“lemons” are screened out of the market over time. Second, the reputation system creates
additional incentives for borrowers to repay debts, which results in a lower default probability
and an increase in lender’s welfare. Third, with more effort exerted due to reputational
incentives, borrowers have a better chance of having credit access. This result highlights the
effect that reputation systems have on alleviating the welfare loss from credit rationing (see
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). I also observe that some good borrowers may accidentally default.
Borrowers that have lost their “reputation” can only take outside options for the rest of time
under the current mechanism. This reduces borrowers’ surplus in future loans.
To address potential long-run inefficiencies due to accidental loss of reputation, the last
part of my counterfactual analysis considers a case where borrowers are offered an option
to buy Payment Protection Insurance (PPI). This insurance covers loan repayments for a
set period of time if borrowers are unable to repay in certain situations.8 The intuition of
this mechanism is straightforward. If a borrower wants to maintain a good reputation (and
hence credit access in the future), but also worries about future negative shocks, he or she
can purchase this insurance to hedge against that risk. From the counterfactual experiment,
I find that the rate of transaction in the second loans increases, and around 98 percent of
the welfare loss from asymmetric information is recovered by this mechanism. This policy
intervention has strong empirical relevance, especially for small businesses who find peer-to-
peer lending an attractive financing alternative (see Segal, 2015) and who rely heavily on
this form of credit access for their success and growth.
My paper contributes to the literature that studies the value of reputation using structural
models (Yoganarasimhan, 2013; Saeedi, 2014; Lewis and Zervas, 2016; Bai 2016). I am the
first to quantify the extent to which reputation/feedback systems improve the total welfare of
8These circumstances usually include being made redundant at one’s job or not being able to work
because of an accident or illness. For details of PPI, see https://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/income-payment-
protection.
5
market participants when both adverse selection and moral hazard are present. My results
confirm three important channels through which the welfare gain is achieved. My paper
also relates to the literature that uses hedonic regressions to study the qualitative effect of
reputation/review systems on e-commerce platforms (Melnik and Alm, 2002; Eaton, 2005;
Jin and Kato, 2006; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007; Cabral and Hortacsu, 2010), and online
labor markets (Lin et al, 2016). I provide new empirical evidence that reputational incentives
impact market outcomes and borrowers’ behavior in online marketplaces for consumer loans.
There has been a long discussion on how to test the existence, and further disentangle
the effects, of adverse selection and moral hazard in the empirical literature (Chiappori and
Salanie, 2000; Chiappori and Salanie, 2002; Abbring et al., 2003; Chiappori et al., 2006).
My paper provides quantitative results on the welfare loss from adverse selection and moral
hazard separately, and I find that moral hazard plays an important role in credit markets.9
However, the existing literature on empirical contract models of credit markets mainly focuses
on revealing borrowers’ private information through screening/signaling devices (Adams et
al., 2009; Einav et al., 2012; Einav et al., 2013; Kawai et al., 2016).
The third contribution of this paper is on identification of contract models. In the existing
literature, Perrigne and Vuong (2011) impose a “truth-telling” condition so that there is a
one-to-one mapping between private information and observed prices. Kawai et al. (2016)
rely on the fact that a borrower’s type and signal have a one-to-one mapping in a separating
equilibrium. Gayle and Miller (2015) study models of managerial compensation and assume
that some levels of revenue can only be achieved through high effort. The identification
strategy in this paper takes advantage of the dynamic structure. I exploit variations in the
state transition process to recover borrowers’ unobserved type distribution, which does not
require a one-to-one mapping from observables. In addition, I recover probabilities related
to unobserved effort levels without assuming that the support of revenue varies with effort.
In a separate paper, I develop general identification strategies for dynamic models with
unobserved choice variables, which can be easily applied to other types of contract models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I summarize data patterns and show
empirical evidence of the value of reputation in Section 2. A structural model is provided in
Section 3, with the corresponding identification strategies in Section 4. I present estimation
results in Section 5 and the details of counterfactual experiments in Section 6. Section 7
concludes.
9A related paper by Bajari et al. (2014) finds adverse selection is an important source of inefficiency in
medical insurance markets.
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2 Institutional Background and Data Summary
In this paper, I use a large transaction-level dataset from Prosper.com. Institutional details
of this website are introduced in this section. I then summarize data patterns and provide
empirical evidence that reputational incentives have an impact on borrowers’ behavior and
market outcomes.
2.1 Institutional Background
Prosper.com is one of the largest peer-to-peer lending markets in the US. This website aims
to provide a platform for individual lenders and borrowers to meet with each other without
going through a complicated process as in traditional banking systems. Since its founding
in 2005, the website has initiated more than nine billion dollars in loans and has attracted
more than two million registered members. On Prosper.com, borrowers list loan requests
between $2,000 and $35,000 and individual investors invest as little as $25 in each loan
listing they select.10 On average, each loan is funded by 43 individual investors, reflecting
the crowdfunding feature of this market.11 Prosper handles the servicing of the loan on
behalf of the matched borrowers and investors; it makes profit by charging both borrowers
and lenders service fees proportional to the amount funded.12
The market works in the following manner. To post a listing online, a borrower needs to
provide basic information about himself to the website, including his social security number,
employment status, whether he is a homeowner, annual income, etc. Prosper hires a third-
party credit report agency to verify the applicant’s identity and credit history. The borrower’s
FICO score, total number of delinquencies, current number of credit lines and so on are
thereby revealed to the website. After the verification stage, the borrower is assigned a credit
grade and can post a listing online, specifying the amount he requests and the purpose of the
loan.13 Then the website decides on the interest rate for each listing posted. After seeing the
interest rate, the borrower has the option to withdraw his listing before it is funded. Once
the borrower decides to participate, it takes fourteen days for a listing to expire. Before
the listing expires, lenders observe all posted information and decide whether or not to fund
the loan. An example of a listing is shown in Figure 4. From this example, it is clear that
lenders not only observe borrowers’ detailed credit profiles, but also their loan and payment
histories. As long as the amount requested is reached, the listing is successfully funded and
10For details of the company, see https://www.prosper.com/plp/about/.
11The average number of investors for each loan is calculated using loans originated between January
2011 and December 2014.
12For details of the fee structure, see https://www.prosper.com/help/contextual/fees/.
13The borrower may also write a short paragraph about him/herself or about the description of the loan.
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the loan is originated. In the following 12-60 months, the borrower needs to pay back the
loan, while it is possible that defaults and/or late payments occur in the repayment process.
Note that if borrowers default, only lenders bear the loss in this market.
Compared to traditional lending markets, Prosper, as a representative of other peer-to-
peer lending marketplaces, has the following distinct features. From borrowers’ perspective,
application requirements are easier to satisfy in online credit markets. As long as borrowers’
basic information is verified by the website, borrowers are allowed to post a listing online.
Thus even borrowers with relatively low credit scores may obtain access to credit. For
borrowers with good credit scores, they are charged lower interest rates by these markets
due to lower operational costs.14 In addition, it is more convenient and much faster for
borrowers to take a loan online than a personal loan in a bank. This is particularly the
case when the amount of the loan is relatively small. From lenders’ perspective, there is
no collateral required on Prosper, which may indicate a higher level of risk. However, due
to the crowdfunding feature of this market, it is convenient for lenders to diversify their
investment portfolios so as to reduce idiosyncratic risks. Moreover, this website adopts a
harsh punishment scheme to disincentivize default. That is, borrowers who have defaulted
once are not allowed to borrow from the website again.
2.2 Data Summary
The data used in this paper include all listings (some of which become loans) that were
originated on Prosper between January 2011 and December 2014. The clean dataset I
obtain contains 114,804 listings that come from 102,528 unique borrowers.15 Overall, about
67 percent of loans are used for debt consolidation, 7 percent for home improvement, 5
percent for business, and the rest for other purposes. 30 percent of borrowers have FICO
scores below 600, and 94 percent of borrowers are employed.16 I characterize borrowers
into different groups based on their repeated borrowing patterns. Borrowers in Category 1
appeared only once during the period I observe. Borrowers in Categories 2 – 4 appeared
twice and are sorted by the different statuses of their first loans at the time the second loans
14The average APR for credit cards is around 20%. For borrowers with credit scores higher than 600, 700
and 800, the average interest rates from Prosper are 16.92%, 13.70% and 9.76%, respectively.
15The original dataset contains 192,916 listings. However, by November 8, 2016, there are still 63,790
ongoing loans that come from 62,841 unique borrowers. To ensure all loan outcomes are observed for each
individual, I drop borrowers with ongoing loans. I also keep only one listing for each borrower within a
short period (one month) to take care of the cases where borrowers may propose multiple listings for one
monetary demand. I also drop borrowers with missing information. In addition, I focus on borrowers who
have at most three listings, since the proportion of borrowers that have more than three listings is less than
1 percent.
16The distribution of their stated monthly income is shown in Figure 5. Summary statistics of other
variables used in the regressions or estimation are provided in Table 8.
8
were originated. Specifically, their first loans may be paid off, still ongoing, or not funded
(possibly withdrawn by themselves). Borrowers in Category 5 proposed three listings. The
percentage of borrowers in each category is summarized in Table 1. I find that 89 percent of
the borrowers appeared once, which indicates that the probability of receiving a future money
demand shock for borrowers is approximately 11 percent.17 There is a small proportion of
borrowers that appeared three times during the time period I observe. For borrowers who
appeared twice with their first loans funded, about 60 percent of them proposed their second
listings when the first loans were still ongoing.
Table 1: Repeated Borrowing Pattern
Data Category Note Freq. Percent
1 appear once 91,891 89.63
2 appear twice: first loan is paid off 3,247 3.17
3 appear twice: first loan is ongoing 5,163 5.04
4 appear twice: first listing is withdrawn or unfunded 597 0.58
5 appear three times 1,630 1.59
Total 102,528 100.00
Figure 1 compares the distributions of credit grades for borrowers’ first and second list-
ings. Prosper characterizes borrowers into seven credit groups, from AA (best) to HR (worst).
From this figure, it is clear that a larger proportion of borrowers falls into better credit groups
(include AA, A and B) in the second listings. This situation may be attributed to selection of
borrowers across two loans. Borrowers I observe in the second listings must have no defaults
in their first loans. This group of borrowers may be inherently better borrowers with higher
credit grades. Alternatively, the shift of credit grade distribution may be driven by the up-
dating of borrowers’ credit grades after the first loans’ outcomes realize. For instance, after
paying back their loans, borrowers are very likely to be characterized into better groups by
the reputation system. The selection and updating channels jointly determine the empirical
pattern in Figure 1. To gain a better understanding of how the reputation system refines
the pool of borrowers over time, in Section 5 I use my structural estimates to disentangle
these two channels.
To better understand the differences between credit groups, Table 2 summarizes the
average amount requested (in dollars), average interest rates, withdraw and funding prob-
abilities, and default and late payment rates for borrowers by different credit categories.
17According to the rule of this website, borrowers that default once cannot borrow again from this
website, so I cannot observe the appearance of those borrowers when they receive future money demand
shocks. Moreover, it is hard to rule out the possibility that borrowers may borrow from other places instead
even if they need money. Therefore, 11 percent is a lower bound on the arrival rate of future money demand
shocks.
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Figure 1: Histograms of Credit Grade for Borrowers’ First and Second Listings
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Credit Grades
Credit Grades AA A B C D E HR All
Avg. Amt. Requested($) 13250.31 12974.22 12982.66 11813.24 9179.09 5106.38 3586.34 10662.36
Avg. Interest Rate (%) 7.53 10.99 14.72 18.58 23.57 28.2 31.53 18.34
Withdraw Prob. (%) 6.39 5.56 5.66 5.52 7.77 6.13 11.26 6.43
Funding Prob. (%) 89.42 91.11 91.37 92.09 87.7 92.29 71.82 89.51
Default Prob. (%) 6.37 14.15 21.53 28.55 31.56 33.93 34.19 24.23
Late Payment Prob. (%) 2.64 5.61 8.58 11.02 15.47 16.5 20.86 10.75
Number of Obs. 8,231 21,166 22,271 24,964 18,046 12,196 7,930 114,804
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Table 3: Regression Results of Interest Rate on Past Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES borrower rate borrower rate borrower rate
second loan -0.00902***
(0.000336)
overlap 0.00208*** 0.00157***
(0.000409) (0.000415)
late ever 0.00452***
(0.000663)
Constant 0.317*** 0.303*** 0.303***
(0.000986) (0.00156) (0.00156)
Observations 16,820 8,410 8,410
R-squared 0.932 0.937 0.937
Note: Control for Borrowers’ observables, year dummies and loan characteristics. Standard errors in
parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
There is a clear pattern for interest rates and default probabilities. Borrowers with lower
credit grades are charged higher interest rates. Their default probabilities are also higher.
This phenomenon intuitively captures the trade-off faced by lenders – higher risks must be
compensated by higher returns.
2.3 Empirical Evidence on the Effect of Reputation
In this section, I provide empirical evidence on how market prices, borrowers’ behavior and
loan outcomes are affected by the reputation system. I first investigate whether the interest
rates charged on borrowers vary with past loan outcomes for a given individual. Table 3
presents regression results of interest rate on past loan outcomes controlling for borrowers’
observables, year dummies, and loan characteristics. Specifically, Column 1 shows that if
borrowers have previously funded loans, the interest rates for their second loans are lower.
Columns 2 – 3 further illustrate that the second loans which overlap with first loans or
have late payments prior to them are associated with higher interest rates. These results
indicate that the interest rate as a pricing device appears to “reward” prior successful loan
repayment behavior, and “punish” late payments or uncertainty from overlapping loans.18
Combining this with the institutional feature that once a borrower defaults, he is unable to
18To alleviate the concern that borrowers may first request and pay off a small loan in order to get better
deals for later larger loans, I run a regression of amount requested on whether a loan is the second one,
controlling for a set of observables. The result in Table 9 illustrates that borrowers’ second loans do not
constitute significantly larger requests.
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Table 4: Logit Regression of Default on Whether the Loan is the Second-closed Loan
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES default default default default
second closed loan 0.390*** 0.359*** 0.481*** 0.456***
(0.0480) (0.0731) (0.0863) (0.149)
borrower rate 13.10*** 12.66*** 16.09*** 17.68***
(1.347) (1.979) (2.238) (3.678)
Constant -4.572*** -4.659*** -5.960*** -6.472***
(0.414) (0.608) (0.706) (1.136)
Second Loan for Debt Consolidation Y Y Y
FICO Below 600 Y Y
Long Gap Between Starting Dates Y
Observations 10,166 4,630 3,550 1,696
Note: Control for Borrowers’ observables, year dummies and loan characteristics. Standard errors in
parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
borrow again, we can see that the reputation/feedback system imposes dynamic incentives
on forward-looking borrowers through pricing schemes and entry restrictions.19
To further examine the causal impact of the reputation/feedback system on borrowers’
behavior and market outcomes, ideally we would have an experimental setting with one group
given reputational incentives and another serving as a control group. Without such data,
I find one institutional feature very useful: borrowers on this website could propose their
second listings even when their first loans are still in process. This feature provides me with a
group of borrowers who have two overlapping loans. I arrange the two loans for each borrower
based on their closing dates. For the first- and the second-closed loans, the composition of
borrowers remain the same. If borrowers do not react to reputational incentives (or are
myopic), then the default behavior is mainly driven by types. Given the same group of
borrowers, we would expect the default rates for the first- and the second-closed loans are
the same. However, if borrowers react to dynamic incentives (or are forward-looking), once
default occurs, borrowers, knowing that they cannot enter again, lose incentive to pay back
their existing loans, which leads to a higher default rate for the second-closed loans.
Under either hypothesis, defaults for the first- and the second-closed loans are positively
correlated.20 Column 1 in Table 4 shows that the second-closed loans have a significantly
higher default rate after controlling for observables. Since I compare the average default
19The rule that once-defaulted borrowers are prohibited from future credit access is inline with the incen-
tive effects of terminations discussed in the work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1983).
20The positive correlation between the defaults in two loans is confirmed in Table 10 in the Appendix.
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rates on two loans for the same group of borrowers, the higher default rate for the second-
closed loans is not driven by the selection of borrowers. This result suggests that borrowers
are likely to respond to reputational incentives.21 As a robustness check, Column 2 restricts
the sample to borrowers whose second loans are not for debt consolidation so as to alleviate
concerns for re-financing. Column 3 further restricts the sample to borrowers whose initial
FICO scores are below 600 in order to ensure that borrowers’ outside options cannot get
much worse after defaulting on their first loans. Finally, Column 4 focuses on the group of
borrowers with long gaps between the starting dates of their two loans. For this subsample,
the issue that two correlated negative income shocks realize within a short period is mitigated
somewhat. To summarize, this empirical exercise provides suggestive evidence that borrowers
are responsive to the dynamic incentives imposed by the reputation/feedback system. When
the incentives to repay debts are reduced, default rates significantly increase.
3 Model
In this section, I develop a finite-horizon dynamic model of a credit market in which borrowers
and lenders interact repeatedly over time. I first describe main players – borrowers, lenders
and the website – and then analyze their strategies. The equilibrium of the model is discussed
last.
3.1 Basic Set-up
3.1.1 Borrowers
In the model, borrowers are dynamic and discount the future at the rate of δ. Borrowers
are heterogeneous in default cost c ∈ Θc, which is their private information.22 If types
are discrete, Θc = {c1, c2, · · · , cJc}; for continuous types, Θc = [c, c¯]. Fc(·) : Θc → [0, 1]
represents the cumulative distribution function of the default cost. The distribution is public
knowledge. Borrowers may want to take out multiple loans. Let t = 1, 2, · · · , T index for each
loan period of a borrower. Borrowers’ utility associated with a given loan t is U(·;α), with
α as the risk-aversion parameter. Assume U ′(·;α) > 0 and U ′′(·;α) < 0. Let i = 1, 2, · · · , N
index each borrower. The rest of this section considers borrower i. To simplify the notation,
I drop subscript i.
21Another explanation for the higher default rate of the second-closed loans is that borrowers are more
likely to leave the market after the second loans, so they have less incentives to repay the second loans. This
also suggests that borrowers are responsive to dynamic incentives.
22There are different ways to introduce borrower heterogeneity in observationally equivalent models. I
follow Kawai et al (2016) to interpretate c as borrower’s default cost.
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Once the borrower applies for a loan, he is assigned an interest rate rt by the website and
chooses effort et ∈ [0,∞] to maximize his expected payoff. Let Rt ∈ [0, R¯] denote the revenue
of a given loan. The revenue is scaled by the size of the loan. The borrower’s effort et affects
the distribution of Rt in a stochastic way. Let FRt|et(·|et) represent the revenue distribution
conditional on effort. Assume that for any e2 > e1, FRt|e2(·|e2) first order stochastically
dominates FRt|e1(·|e1). The borrower incurs cost φ(et, θt) when exerting effort et. θt ∈ Θθ is
the transitory shock to the cost of effort that realizes for each loan t. The distribution of θt
is stationary and related to borrowers’ default costs. Use Fθt|c(·|c) : Θθ → [0, 1] to represent
the distribution of θt conditional on c. Assume that φ
′(·, θt) > 0, and φ′′(·, θt) > 0.
For each loan t, the borrower draws an outside option v0,t from Fv(·), the mean of which
is v¯0. If the borrower’s expected payoff from having the loan is lower than v0,t, he withdraws
the listing and takes the outside option. Otherwise the borrower posts the listing online. If
his listing is funded by lenders, the borrower exerts effort et. If not funded, the borrower
takes the outside option. Use Wt = 1 to represent the case when the borrower withdraws
his listing. Wt = 0 then represents the case when the borrower stays on the market (or
participates) after observing interest rate rt. Let It = 1 denote the case when the listing
is funded by lenders; It = 0 otherwise. For each funded loan, the outcomes include the
borrower’s default and late payment performances. Let Dt = 1 denote the case when default
occurs for loan t; Dt = 0 otherwise. Assume the borrower’s default cost is large enough
that if Rt ≥ 1 + rt, Dt = 0, and if Rt < 1 + rt, Dt = 1. Let Lt = 1 denote the case
when late payment occurs for loan t; Lt = 0 otherwise. Assume that for any e2 > e1,
Pr(Lt = 1|e2) < Pr(Lt = 1|e1).
The belief about the borrower’s type when he applies for loan t is public information,
which is maintained by the website and is easily accessible by lenders. This belief is an
aggregate state variable that depends on the borrower’s history. Assume that its transition
follows a first-order Markov process. That is, the belief about the borrower’s type when
he applies for loan t depends on the previous belief and his history at loan t − 1. Define
H = {nl, l, np} as a collection of realized loan outcomes. Let Ht−1 ∈ H denote the borrower’s
history at loan t − 1. Specifically, Ht−1 = nl, or l represent the cases when the borrower
paid off his debts and had no late payments or had late payments at loan t− 1, respectively.
Ht−1 = np represents the case when the borrower did not participate (withdrew the listing
by himself or was not funded by lenders) at t− 1.
3.1.2 Lenders and the Website
I summarize the supply side of this market by assuming that lending services are provided by
a risk-neutral, representative lender, who is a one-time player and cares about the expected
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payoff of each project. The simplification of the lender’s side model is mainly because
individual lenders’ investment strategies are not observed. Instead, only the final funding
decisions are recorded. The crowdfunding feature of this market provides a rationale for this
simplification.23,24 Since individual lenders usually invest a small amount (as little as $25)
on a specific project, they are likely to be risk-neutral for each project. As a result, the
risk-neutral assumption for the representative lender is not very restrictive.
For each loan t, the representative lender draws an outside option µ0,t from Fµ(·). The
lender does not observe default costs of borrowers, but he has access to public information
on borrowers’ history, which allows him to form beliefs about borrowers’ default cost distri-
bution. Denote the lender’s belief about the borrower’s default cost when he applies for loan
t as St ∈ S. Specifically,
(1) When no histories are available (t = 1), beliefs coincide with the population distribution
of borrowers’ default cost. St = Fc(·) : Θc → [0, 1].
(2) For loan t ∈ {2, · · · , T}, beliefs are updated based on different loan outcomes for any
given interest rate rt−1. St(St−1, rt−1, Ht−1) = Fc|St−1,rt−1,Ht−1(·|St−1, rt−1, Ht−1) : Θc →
[0, 1].
Since the lender makes investment decisions after observing borrowers’ participation, the
beliefs are further updated. The loan is funded as long as the expected revenue for the
lender exceeds his outside investment option µ0,t.
For all loan listings, the website adopts a decision rule to set interest rates which depends
on beliefs about borrowers’ default cost distribution. The pricing rule is public knowledge.
Here, I take the website’s pricing scheme as given. Later in the counterfactual analysis, I
will be specific about the website’s objective function.
3.2 Borrowers’ Effort Choices
For loans t, borrowers choose effort levels to maximize their expected payoffs once their loans
are originated. Borrowers also need to consider whether or not to withdraw their listings
23The final funding decisions are approximated by aggregating the funding decisions of small individual
investors. Consider the case where a borrower requests M dollars from the website. There are n¯ investors
in total, and each investor chooses to invest m dollars or not. As a result, for the project to be funded, we
need at least n = Mm lenders to invest. The probability that each lender invests is pi, which depends on the
expected payoff from the project monotonically. Let X denote the number of lenders that choose to invest.
X ∼ N(n¯pi, n¯pi(1 − pi)) when n¯ is large enough (by Central Limit Theorem). Therefore, Pr(X ≥ n) =
1− Φ( n−n¯pi√
n¯pi(1−pi)
). The final funding probability is again a monotone function of the expected return from
the project if n− n¯pi > 0 and pi < 0.5.
24I admit that this simplification ignores potential competition and herding effect on lender’s side. See
Zhang and Liu (2012).
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after observing the interest rates assigned by the website. The state of a borrower’s decision
problem includes the belief about his default cost distribution St, interest rate rt, cost of
effort θt, and an outside option draw v0,t.
3.2.1 The Last Loan
In the last loan, borrowers are myopic. For a borrower with default cost c, his expected
payoff from having loan T with interest rate rT and exerting effort level e with the cost of
effort θT is defined in the following equation.
V˜B,c,T (e, rT , θT ) =
∫ R¯
1+rT
U(R− 1− rT )dFRT |e(R|e) +
∫ 1+rT
0
U(R− c)dFRT |e(R|e)− φ(e, θT ).
(3.1)
The borrower decides his optimal effort level for loan T through the following payoff maxi-
mization problem:
ec,T (rT , θT ) = arg max
e
V˜B,c,T (e, rT , θT ). (3.2)
Before exerting effort, the borrower decides whether or not to withdraw the listing he has
proposed. The borrower’s choice-specific (withdraw the listing or not) value function is as
follows.
V¯ 0B,c,T (rT , θT ) = max
e
V˜B,c,T (e, rT , θT );
V¯ 1B,c,T (v0,T ) = v0,T .
(3.3)
Equation (3.3) implies that (1) if the borrower stays on the market, he will choose the optimal
effort to maximize his expected payoff; (2) if the borrower withdraws his listing, he will get
the outside option v0,T . For the borrower with type c, the probability that he participates is
Pr(Wc,T = 0|rT , θT ) = Pr(V¯ 0B,c,T (rT , θT ) > v0,T ) = Fv(V¯ 0B,c,T (rT , θT )). (3.4)
Even if the borrower decides to stay on the market, he may not be funded by lenders with
some probability. If this occurs, the borrower takes the outside option. The ex-ante value
function for the borrower before the withdrawal and investment decisions are made is
VB,c,T (ST , rT , θT , v0,T ) =Pr(IT = 1|ST , rT ,WT = 0) max
WT={0,1}
{V¯ 0B,c,T (rT , θT ), V¯ 1B,c,T (v0,T )}
+Pr(IT = 0|ST , rT ,WT = 0)V¯ 1B,c,T (v0,T ).
(3.5)
In Equation (3.5), Pr(IT = 1|ST , rT ,WT = 0) represents the probability that loan T is
funded given the belief ST and the interest rate rT if the borrower does not withdraw his
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listing. I will derive the funding probability when discussing the lender’s side problem in
Section 3.3.
3.2.2 Preceding Loans
In loans t < T , borrowers are forward-looking and care about their future continuation
values. If a borrower with type c has no defaults on previous loans, his expected payoff from
loan t with belief St, interest rate rt, and effort level e with the cost of effort θt is defined in
the following equation.
V˜B,c,t(e, St, rt, θt)
=
∫ R¯
1+rt
[U(R− 1− rt)
+ Pr(Lt = 0|e)δ EVB,c,t+1(St+1(St, rt, Ht = nl), rt+1, θt+1, v0,t+1)
+ Pr(Lt = 1|e)δ EVB,c,t+1(St+1(St, rt, Ht = l), rt+1, θt+1, v0,t+1)]dFRt|e(R|e)
+
∫ 1+rt
0
[U(R− c) +
T∑
τ=t+1
δτ−tv¯0]dFRt|e(R|e)− φ(e, θt)
(3.6)
Effort level e enters the borrower’s expected payoff through three channels. First, it affects
the revenue distribution stochastically. If the realized revenue is enough to pay off the loan,
the borrower with high default cost will repay his debts. If the revenue is not sufficient to
repay the debts, the borrower defaults. If default occurs, the borrower pays the default cost
for loan t, and is not allowed to enter the market again. For τ > t, the borrower takes
the average of the outside option distribution in expectation. Second, effort level e affects
the realization of late payments. Conditional on higher effort, there is a lower chance that
late payments occur. As another dimension of loan outcomes, late payments affect lenders’
future beliefs about the borrower’s type, which enters the expected value function at t + 1.
When the borrower does not default and has no late payments at loan t, his history Ht = nl,
and the future belief St+1(St, rt, Ht = nl) = Fc|St,rt,Ht(·|St, rt, Ht = nl). If late payments
occur at loan t, the history becomes Ht = l, and the future belief is affected accordingly.
Note that the borrower’s cost of effort and outside option draws are assumed independent
across different loans, so the expected value function does not depend on θt and v0,t. Third,
the effort level induces cost φ(e, θt). The borrower decides his optimal effort level for loan t
through the following payoff maximization problem:
ec,t(St, rt, θt) = arg max
e
V˜B,c,t(e, St, rt, θt). (3.7)
Before exerting effort, the borrower decides whether or not to withdraw the listing he
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has proposed at t. I then define the borrower’s choice-specific (withdraw the listing or not)
value function as follows.
V¯ 0B,c,t(St, rt, θt) = max
e
V˜B,c,t(e, St, rt, θt)
V¯ 1B,c,t(St, rt, v0,t) = v0,t + δ EVB,c,t+1(St+1(St, rt, Ht = np), rt+1, θt+1, v0,t+1)
(3.8)
Equation (3.8) implies that (1) if the borrower stays on the market, he will choose the optimal
effort to maximize his expected payoff, and (2) if the borrower withdraws his listing, he will
get the outside option v0,t plus the future continuation value conditional on having history
Ht = np. For the borrower with type c, the probability that he participates at loan t is
therefore
Pr(Wc,t = 0|St, rt, θt) = Pr(V¯ 0B,c,t(St, rt, θt) > V¯ 1B,c,t(St, rt, v0,t)). (3.9)
Again, following the same argument for the last loan, I construct the ex-ante value function
for the borrower before the withdrawal and investment decisions are made.
VB,c,t(St, rt, θt, v0,t) =Pr(It = 1|St, rt,Wt = 0) max
Wt={0,1}
{V¯ 0B,c,t(St, rt, θt), V¯ 1B,c,t(St, rt, v0,t)}
+Pr(It = 0|St, rt,Wt = 0)V¯ 1B,c,t(St, rt, v0,t).
(3.10)
3.3 Lenders’ Investment Decisions
The representative lender makes investment decisions by comparing the expected revenues of
loans with his outside options. The lender makes decisions after observing the participation
of borrowers. As a result, the lender’s belief about the borrower’s type is updated. Denote
the joint density of (c, θt) conditional on observing the borrower’s participation as
fc,θt|Wt=0,St,rt(c, θt|Wt = 0, St, rt) =
Pr(Wc,t = 0|St, rt, θt)fθt|c(θt|c)st(c)∫
c′
∫
θ′ Pr(Wc′,t = 0|St, rt, θ′)dFθt|c(θ′|c′)dSt(c′)
, (3.11)
where the participation probabilities for the borrower at different loan specifications are
derived in Equations (3.4) and (3.9). In Equation (3.11), st(c) represents the probability
density of type c given belief St. That is, st(c) = S
′
t(c).
For any given belief St and interest rate rt, the lender’s revenue conditional on (θt, c) is
derived in the following equation:
p˜iL,t(St, rt, θt, c,Wt = 0) =
∫ R¯
1+rt
(1 + rt)dFRt|ec,t(St,rt,θt)(R|ec,t(St, rt, θt))− 1, (3.12)
which implies that, whenever the borrower pays back the loan, the lender receives 1 + rt.
The probability that the borrower pays off his debt depends on the effort level ec,t(St, rt, θt).
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Since the lender does not observe the borrower’s default cost c and cost of effort θt, the
lender computes his expected revenue by weighting the revenue for each type in Equation
(3.12) using the updated belief about the borrower’s type derived in Equation (3.11).
piL,t(St, rt,Wt = 0) =
∫
c′
∫
θ′
p˜iL,t(St, rt, θ
′, c′,Wt = 0)fc,θt|Wt=0,St,rt(c
′, θ′|Wt = 0, St, rt)dθ′dc′.
(3.13)
The lender invests in the project if piL,t(St, rt,Wt = 0) > µ0,t and the funding probability is
therefore Pr(It = 1|St, rt,Wt = 0) = Fµ(piL,t(St, rt,Wt = 0)).
3.4 Equilibrium
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium of the model. I first summarize the strategies
for borrowers and lenders. A pure strategy for the borrower with type c ∈ Θc specifies an
effort choice and a withdrawal decision. Specifically, ec,t : S × [0, r¯] × Θθ → [0,∞] specifies
the borrower’s effort choice decision for a belief, an interest rate he is assigned, and a cost
of effort draw. Wc,t : S × [0, r¯] × Θθ × R → {0, 1} specifies the borrower’s binary choice of
participation for a given state (including a belief, an interest rate, a cost of effort draw, and
an outside option). A pure strategy for the lender It : S × [0, r¯] × R → {0, 1} specifies his
binary investment decision for a belief, an interest rate, and an outside investment option.25
For any given pricing rule of the website, a pure strategy Markov perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium for the game consists of borrowers’ effort choice strategies ec,t : S × [0, r¯]×Θθ → [0,∞]
and participation strategies Wc,t : S × [0, r¯] × Θθ × R → {0, 1} for each type c, and the
lender’s investment strategies It : S × [0, r¯]× R→ {0, 1}, for each loan t, such that:
(1) For the borrower with type c, for any belief St, interest rate rt, and cost of effort θt
he chooses the optimal effort level, and participates only if the expected payoff from
participation exceeds the value of withdrawing the listing at t.
(2) Given the optimal effort choices and participation strategies for borrowers with each
type, for any belief St and interest rate rt the lender invests only if the expected revenue
of the listing exceeds the draw of his outside investment options.
(3) Borrowers’ strategies are consistent with the beliefs. For any St−1 and rt−1, the belief
about the borrower’s type conditional on history Ht−1 is formed through a Bayesian
25Borrowers and lenders have Markov strategies, which depend only on the current state of belief, not
the entire history.
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updating process that involves borrowers’ optimal effort choices.26 For each c ∈ Θc,
fc|St−1,rt−1,Ht−1(c|St−1, rt−1, Ht−1) =
fHt−1|St−1,rt−1,c(Ht−1|St−1, rt−1, c)st−1(c)∫
c′ fHt−1|St−1,rt−1,c(Ht−1|St−1, rt−1, c′)dSt−1(c′)
.
(3.14)
where
fHt−1|St−1,rt−1,c(Ht−1|St−1, rt−1, c) =
∫
θ′
Pr(Ht−1|St−1, rt−1, θ′, c)dFθt|c(θ′|c).
The following equation derives the probability of observing Ht−1 = nl, which represents the
case where Wt−1 = 0, It−1 = 1, Dt−1 = 0, and Lt−1 = 0 – i.e., the borrower participates, is
funded, and pays off the debts with no late payments at loan t− 1.
Pr(Ht−1 = nl|St−1, rt−1, θ′, c)
=Pr(Wt−1 = 0, It−1 = 1, Dt−1 = 0, Lt−1 = 0|St−1, rt−1, θ′, c)
=(1− FRt−1|ec,t−1(1 + rt−1|ec,t−1(St−1, rt−1, θ′)))Pr(Lt−1 = 0|ec,t−1(St−1, rt−1, θ′))
Pr(Wc,t−1 = 0|St−1, rt−1, θ′)Pr(It−1 = 1|St−1, rt−1,Wt−1 = 0)
(3.15)
In Equation (3.15), the effort level ec,t−1(St−1, rt−1, θ′) drives the realization of loan outcomes,
which further affects the updating process of beliefs. The derivation of equilibrium conditions
when Ht−1 = l or Ht−1 = np is similar. In Appendix A, I sketch the proof of the existence of
the equilibrium in a simplified setting. The model can be solved using backward induction.
4 Identification
In this section, I provide nonparametric identification strategies to recover the joint dis-
tribution of the borrower’s type and the shock to his cost of effort. I also identify utility
parameters in borrowers’ payoff functions and the outside option distributions for borrowers
and lenders under certain parametric assumptions.
The difficulties in identification are two-fold. First, borrower’s types and effort levels,
which jointly determine loan outcomes, are both unobserved. Borrower’s type is persistent
across loans, while effort levels are also affected by cost of effort, which realizes for each
loan. To disentangle these two unobserved sources, I first use transitions of state variables
across periods to pin down the type distribution for borrowers with multiple loans. I then
rely on variations in default and late payment performances within a period to recover the
26This is inline with the discussion in Maskin and Tirole (2001), “... in a Markov perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of a game with incomplete information, beliefs are not ‘passive’: beliefs about a player’s type
are updated on the basis of his or her behvior.”
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distribution of cost of effort. Using variations in interest rates, I am able to further identify
utility primitives. The second difficulty comes from the fact that borrowers enter the market
again only if they have no defaults in their previous loans. That is, the sample of borrowers
with multiple loans is endogenously selected. I match the default probability from the model
with that from the data before selection occurs to recover the original type distribution.
4.1 Data and Primitives
I now fix the notation for the observed data and model primitives to be identified. The rest
of this section is for borrower i = 1, 2, · · · , N . I drop the subscript i to simplify the notation.
Denote the vector of observed state variables for loan τ as
Oτ = {rτ , Dτ , Lτ , Xτ , Kτ ,Wτ , Iτ}.
rτ represents the interest rate. Dτ = 1 when the borrower defaults, and 0 otherwise. Lτ = 1
when late payment occurs, and 0 otherwise. Xτ and Kτ represent the borrower’s financial
status (e.g. debt-to-income ratio, homeownership, etc.) and credit grade, respectively. Wτ =
1 means that the borrower withdraws the loan, and Iτ = 1 means that the loan is funded by
lenders. The borrower’s history is observed lenders and the website. If the borrower defaults
at loan τ , there will be no future loans. For those who do not default at τ , define
Hτ =

nl if Wτ = 0, Iτ = 1, Dτ = 0, and Lτ = 0
l if Wτ = 0, Iτ = 1, Dτ = 0, and Lτ = 1
np if Wτ = 1, or Wτ = 0, Iτ = 0
.
Let Ωτ = {rτ , Xτ , Kτ} contain all observables not involved in Hτ . In the data, I observe
{Oτ}τ=t−1,t for each borrower.
There are two groups of primitives to be identified. The parameters in the first group,
including the joint distribution of the borrower’s private type and cost of effort as well as the
state transition probabilities conditional on each type, are identified nonparametrically. In
this section, I consider a case where borrowers have discrete types c ∈ [c1, c2, , · · · , cJc ] and
the cost of effort θτ takes value from [θ1, θ2, · · · , θJθ ]. It is easy to generalize the identification
strategies for the cases where c and θτ are continuous. However, for illustration purposes,
I stick to discrete types in this section. Let FXτ+1|Xτ ,c denote the type-specific transition
probabilities of the borrower’s financial status, which are also recovered nonparametrically.27
27In the rest of this paper, I drop the realization of the random variables in the joint pdf’s to simplify
the notation. Specifically, for any vector of random variables Y = (Y1, Y2), let fY1,Y2 = fY1,Y2(y1, y2) denote
the joint density of Y . Moreover, for the density of Y1 conditional on Y2 = y2, use fY1|Y2=y2 (or fY1|y2) to
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For the second group, which includes the borrower’s utility primitives and the outside
option distributions of borrowers and lenders, I impose the following parametric assumptions.
Specifically, I assume the borrower has a CARA utility function, U(x) = 1−exp(−αx), where
α is the risk-aversion parameter. The borrower’s cost function is φ(e, θτ ) = θτe
2, where e is
the effort level exerted. The following assumption simplifies the revenue realization process:
I assume that for each loan there are two possible revenues that may realize, Rh and Rl.
The probability that Rh is realized is p(e) = 1− exp(−βe), and the probability that no late
payments appear is L(e) = 1− exp(−γe). Assume the borrower’s outside option v0,τ follows
a normal distribution with mean v(Xτ , Kτ ) = v¯0 + vxXτ + vkKτ and variance equal to 1.
The lender’s outside options are drawn from N(µ0, σ0). To summarize, the parameters of
interest in the model include {Fc, Fθτ |c, FXτ+1|Xτ ,c, α, Rh, Rl, β, γ, v¯0, vx, vk, µ0, σ0}.
4.2 Nonparametric Identification of Private Information Distribu-
tion
In this section, I first use transitions of state variables across periods to pin down the type
distribution for borrowers with multiple loans. From the empirical setting, I find three pieces
of information that are related to the borrower’s unobserved and persistent type, namely,
borrower’s initial characteristics, transition of his financial status, and outcomes of the loan.
These three measurements are assumed independent conditional on the latent type. I use
the dynamic structure of the model in Section 3 to justify this assumption. Following similar
strategies to those found in Hu and Shum (2012), I recover the underlying type distribution
for the selected group of borrowers. I then rely on variations in default and late payment
performances to recover the distribution of cost of effort conditional on each type.
For identification purposes, I impose the following assumption on the dynamic process.
Assumption 1. The dynamic process of {Ot, θt, c} satisfies
(1) the first order Markov process;
(2) conditional independence:
fDt,Lt,It=1,Wt=0,Ωt,θt|Ht−1,Ωt−1,θt−1,c =fDt|rt,θt,c · fLt|rt,θt,c · fIt=1|Wt=0,Ωt,Ht−1
· fWt=0|Ωt,θt,c · frt|Xt,Kt,Ht−1
· fXt|Xt−1,c · fKt|Kt−1,Ht−1 · fθt|c
=fDt,Lt,It=1,Wt=0,Ωt,θt|Ht−1,Xt−1,Kt−1,c.
Assumption 1 has several important implications. First, conditional on effort level for
loan t, Dt and Lt are independent. This assumption is directly motivated by the model,
represent fY1|Y2=y2(y1|y2).
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since conditional on effort levels, the realizations of defaults and late payments are driven by
independent shocks.28 Second, interest rates and probabilities that projects are funded are
only associated with borrowers’ characteristics and histories. In other words, fIt=1|Wt=0,ΩtHt−1
and frt|Xt,Kt,Ht−1 can be directly estimated from the data. This assumption is consistent with
the institutional setting. Under asymmetric information, the website and the lender make
decisions only based on observables. Moreover, the probability that a borrower participates
depends on his expected payoff from the loan and the outside option distribution, the mean
of which is shifted by observed characteristics. The transition of the borrower’s financial
status Xt is governed by c, but the update of his credit grade Kt on this website is mainly
driven by his history. That is to say, fKt|Kt−1,Ht−1 can be also recovered from the data. In
addition, based on the model in Section 3, borrower’s type relates to the distribution of the
cost of effort θt.
Assumption 1 also implies that θt−1 does not enter the Markov transition kernel. As a
result, θt can be integrated out of fDt,Lt,It=1,Wt=0,Ωt,θt|Ht−1,Xt−1,Kt−1,c without losing Markovian
properties.
fDt,Lt,It=1,Wt=0,Ωt|Ht−1,Xt−1,Kt−1,c =
∑
θt
fDt,Lt,It=1,Wt=0,Ωt,θt|Ht−1,Xt−1,Kt−1,c
=fDt,Lt,It=1,Wt=0|Ωt,Ht−1,c · frt|Xt,Kt,Ht−1
· fXt|Xt−1,c · fKt|Kt−1,Ht−1 .
(4.1)
Then the joint distribution of observables for borrowers who have loans at t − 1 and t (i.e.
borrowers with It = 1,Wt = 0 who have no defaults at loan t−1) helps to identify the default
cost distribution and the state transition probabilities through the following equation.
fDt,Lt,It=1,Wt=0,Ωt,Ht−1,Xt−1,Kt−1
frt|Xt,Kt,Ht−1 · fKt|Kt−1,Ht−1
=
∑
c
fDt,Lt,It=1,Wt=0|Ωt,Ht−1,c · fXt|Xt−1,c · fHt−1,Xt−1,Kt−1,c.
(4.2)
Equation (4.2) serves as the key identifying equation for kernels related to the latent
type. Intuitively, this equation provides three pieces of information that are independent
conditional on c. Specifically, type is related to the outcome of the second loan after inte-
grating out effort, type affects the transition process of financial status, and the borrower’s
initial characteristics also reveal some information about his type. These three pieces of
information are treated as “measurements” of the unobserved type.
28The probabilities that default and late payments appear are allowed to be related to some other ob-
servables. For illustration of the key identifying restrictions, in this section I focus on the case when the
realization of defaults and late payments are only driven by effort and some independent shocks.
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Suppose Dt, Kt−1, and c are all discrete random variables. Use jd = 1, · · · , Jd, jk =
1, · · · , Jk and jc = 1, · · · , Jc to index the values of these three variables. I consider the case
where It = 1,Wt = 0, and {rt, Kt, Lt, Ht−1} are fixed, and define the following matrices for
a pair of (Xt, Xt−1).
MDt,Kt−1,Xt,Xt−1 =
[
fDt,L¯t,It=1,Wt=0,r¯t,Xt,K¯t,H¯t−1,Xt−1,Kt−1
fr¯t|Xt,K¯t,H¯t−1 · fK¯t|Kt−1,H¯t−1
∣∣
Dt=jd,Kt−1=jk
]
jd,jk
,
MDt,c,Xt =
[
fDt,L¯t,It=1,Wt=0|r¯t,Xt,K¯t,H¯t−1,c
∣∣
Dt=jd,c=jc
]
jd,jc
,
Mc,Xt,Xt−1 =diag
{[
fXt|Xt−1,c
∣∣
c=jc
]
jc=1,2,··· ,Jc
}
,
Mc,Kt−1,Xt−1 =
[
fH¯t−1,Xt−1,Kt−1,c
∣∣
c=jc,Kt−1=jk
]
jc,jk
.
(4.3)
The matrix form of Equation (4.2) for any (Xt, Xt−1) is therefore
MDt,Kt−1,Xt,Xt−1 = MDt,c,XtMc,Xt,Xt−1Mc,Kt−1,Xt−1 . (4.4)
Given four combinations of (Xt, Xt−1), namely (X¯t, X¯t−1), (Xˆt, X¯t−1), (Xˆt, Xˆt−1), (X¯t, Xˆt−1),
I construct the following equations following Hu and Shum (2012).(
MDt,Kt−1,X¯t,X¯t−1 ·M−1Dt,Kt−1,Xˆt,X¯t−1
)(
MDt,Kt−1,X¯t,Xˆt−1M
−1
Dt,Kt−1,Xˆt,Xˆt−1
)−1
=MDt,c,X¯t
(
Mc,X¯t,X¯t−1M
−1
c,Xˆt,X¯t−1
Mc,Xˆt,Xˆt−1M
−1
c,X¯t,Xˆt−1
)
M−1
Dt,c,X¯t
≡MDt,c,X¯tMc,X¯t,X¯t−1,Xˆt,Xˆt−1M−1Dt,c,X¯t
(4.5)
and (
M−1
Dt,Kt−1,X¯t,X¯t−1
·MDt,Kt−1,X¯t,Xˆt−1
)(
M−1
Dt,Kt−1,Xˆt,X¯t−1
MDt,Kt−1,Xˆt,Xˆt−1
)−1
=M−1
c,Kt−1,X¯t−1
(
M−1
c,X¯t,X¯t−1
Mc,X¯t,Xˆt−1M
−1
c,Xˆt,Xˆt−1
Mc,Xˆt,X¯t−1
)
Mc,Kt−1,X¯t−1
≡M−1
c,Kt−1,X¯t−1
M−1
c,X¯t,X¯t−1,Xˆt,Xˆt−1
Mc,Kt−1,X¯t−1
(4.6)
provided that the following assumption is satisfied.
Assumption 2 (Invertibility). Matrices MDt,c,Xt ,Mc,Xt,Xt−1 ,Mc,Kt−1,Xt−1 are invertible for
the four combinations of (Xt, Xt−1).
Assumption 2 requires jd = jc = jk. For discrete case, it is feasible to regroup different
values to make the numbers of categories equal for Dt, c and Kt−1.29 The economic meaning
of Assumption 2 is as follows. Suppose there are only two types, c ∈ {ch, cl}. For MDt,c,Xt
29Admittedly, this may take less advantage of the variations in the data.
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to be invertible, it is sufficient to have
fDt=1,L¯t,It=1,Wt=0|r¯t,Xt,K¯t,H¯t−1,ch < fDt=1,L¯t,It=1,Wt=0|r¯t,Xt,K¯t,H¯t−1,cl .
This inequality implies that borrowers with low types are more likely to default. Suppose
there are two categories of credit score, K1 > K2. It is sufficient to have fH¯t−1,Xt−1,K1,ch >
fH¯t−1,Xt−1,K2,ch and fH¯t−1,Xt−1,K1,cl < fH¯t−1,Xt−1,K2,cl to ensure the invertibility of Mc,Kt−1,Xt−1 .
The economic intuition behind these inequalities is that high-type borrowers are more likely
to have higher credit grades and low-type borrowers are more likely to have lower grades.
Finally, if the transition probabilities for all combinations of (Xt−1, Xt) conditional on dif-
ferent types are non-zero, Mc,Xt,Xt−1 is invertible. With Assumption 2 satisfied, Equations
(4.5) and (4.6) lead to eigenvalue-eigenvector decompositions of the matrices on the left hand
side. To guarantee the uniqueness of the decomposition, I invoke the following assumption.
Assumption 3 (Uniqueness). The densities in MDt,c,Xt and Mc,Kt−1,Xt−1 satisfy
(i) fDt=1,L¯t,It=1,Wt=0|r¯t,Xt,K¯t,H¯t−1,c decreases with c;
(ii) fH¯t−1,Xt−1,Kt−1,c increases with Kt−1 for c = ch and decreases with Kt−1 for c = cl;
Theorem 1 (Identification). If Assumptions 1 – 3 are satisfied, {Oτ}τ=t−1,t for borrowers
with two loans identifies fXt|Xt−1,c, fDt,Lt,It=1,Wt=0|Ωt,Ht−1,c and fHt−1,Xt−1,Kt−1,c for different
combinations of (Xt−1, Xt) given any fixed values of (rt, Kt, Lt, Ht−1).
The formal proof of Theorem 1 follows Hu (2008). For the continuous case, see Hu
and Schennach (2008). However, from fHt−1,Xt−1,Kt−1,c, I only recover the type distribution
conditional on the borrower having two loans and Ht−1 ∈ {nl, l, np}. This is due to the
selection problem in the data. If borrowers fail to pay off their debts at t − 1, they are
not allowed to enter at t. As a result, no dynamic variations are observed for this group of
borrowers. Further analysis is presented at the end of Section 4.3 to show how to recover
the original type distribution before selection occurs.
Next, I use variations in default and late payment performances within a period to identify
the distribution of θt conditional on each type. Following Assumption 1, I decompose the
identified kernel fDt,Lt,It=1,Wt=0|Ωt,Ht−1,c with respect to θt:
fDt,Lt,It=1,Wt=0|Ωt,Ht−1,c
fIt=1|Wt=0,Ωt,Ht−1
=
∑
θt
(
fDt|rt,θt,c · fLt|rt,θt,c · fWt=0,θt|Ωt,c
)
. (4.7)
The kernels on the left hand side of Equation (4.7) are either identified or directly estimable
from the data. On the right hand side, default and late payment performances are indepen-
dent conditional on the effort level. Furthermore, the borrower’s participation probability is
25
determined by the effort level, his type, and the covariates that shift his outside option distri-
bution. Following a similar strategy, this equation leads to a unique eigenvalue-eigenvector
decomposition under certain assumptions, and therefore fDt|rt,θt,c, fLt|rt,θt,c and fWt=0,θt|Ωt,c
are identified. I provide the theorem and the required assumptions in Appendix B.
4.3 Identification of Utility Primitives
Borrowers make withdrawal decisions by comparing utilities from participation with the ran-
dom draws from the outside option. Thus only the utility levels relative to the outside option
can be identified. Without loss of generality, I normalize the location of the outside option
distribution by fixing the value of v¯0. The borrower’s expected payoff V¯
0
B,c,T (rT , θT ) enters
his participation probability through fWt=0|Ωt,θt,c = Φ(V¯
0
B,c,T (rT , θT )− v(Xt, Kt)), where Φ(·)
represents the cdf of the standard normal distribution. Using the variation in Xt when
Kt = 0, I obtain the following equation,
fWt=0,θt|Xt=X1,Kt=0,rt,c
fWt=0,θt|Xt=X2,Kt=0,rt,c
=
fWt=0|Xt=X1,Kt=0,rt,θt,c · fθt|c
fWt=0|Xt=X2,Kt=0,rt,θt,c · fθt|c
=
Φ(V¯ 0B,c,T (rT , θT )− v¯0 − vxX1)
Φ(V¯ 0B,c,T (rT , θT )− v¯0 − vxX2)
.
(4.8)
The left hand side of Equation (4.8) is identified from previous steps. If I further normalize
vx, V¯
0
B,c,T (rT , θT ) is identified. With variations in Kt, I am able to recover vk, which leads to
the identification of fθt|c.
The identified levels of V¯ 0B,c,T (rT , θT ) are associated with unknown parameters α, Rh, and
the levels of private information (θT , c). The intuition for identification of these parameters
is as follows. The marginal effect of interest rate on V¯ 0B,c,T (rT , θT ) depends only on the shape
of the utility function and the value of high revenue. Under the assumption of CARA utility,
I show that two values of interest rates identify α and Rh in Appendix C.1. Once I normalize
γ, the effort levels are identified from the probability that late payment occurs. Effort enters
borrower’s payoff function through two channels – it affects default probabilities and induces
cost. After plugging the effort levels into the payoff function, I obtain enough restrictions to
pin down the levels of default cost and transitory cost shocks. The details are provided in
Appendix C.2.
In the last part of this section, I focus on the identification of the original type distribution
fc|Xt−1,Kt−1 before selection takes place. After recovering all other primitives in the model, I
am able to match the observed probability of default for all borrowers at period t − 1 with
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the prediction from the model:
fDt−1=0|It−1=1,Wt−1=0,Ωt−1
=
∑
θt−1,c
(
fDt−1=0|rt−1,θt−1,c · fIt−1=1|Wt−1=0,Ωt−1 · fWt−1=0|Ωt−1,θt−1,c · fθt−1|c · fc|Xt−1,Kt−1
)
. (4.9)
In Equation (4.9), I estimate the funding probability fIt−1=1|Wt−1=0,Ωt−1 at period t−1 directly
from the data. fWt−1=0|Ωt−1,θt−1,c represents the participation probability of borrowers with
{Ωt−1, θt−1, c}, which can be computed using borrowers’ optimal effort choices at loan t− 1.
Given all other parameters identified in the previous steps, I solve the borrower’s dynamic
optimization problem. The participation probability is therefore identified with the optimal
level of effort. The only unknowns in Equation (4.9) are the original probabilities of different
default costs conditional on observed characteristics. fc|Xt−1,Kt−1 is therefore identified with
this linear restriction.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Likelihood-Based Estimation Method
Following the identification strategies in Section 4, I construct the likelihood for all individual
borrowers in the sample. Let i = 1, · · · , N be the index for each borrower, and t − 1 and
t represent two loans. Oiτ = {riτ , Diτ , Liτ , Xiτ , Kiτ , Aiτ , DCiτ ,Wiτ , Iiτ}τ=t−1,t contains all
observables for i at loan t. The notation for interest rate (riτ ), default (Diτ ), late payment
(Liτ ), withdraw (Wiτ ) and funding decisions (Iiτ ) remains the same. I incorporate some
other characteristics of borrowers into the estimation in addition to their financial statuses
(Xiτ ) and credit grades (Kiτ ). Specifically, I allow the borrower’s type and the outside option
distribution be associated with Xiτ , Kiτ and the purpose of the loan (whether the loan is
used for debt consolidation, denoted as DCiτ ). The realization of DCiτ depends on the
borrower’s type c. The distribution of θτ conditional on c relies on the amount requested by
the borrower, denoted as Aiτ . The realization of Aiτ depends on borrower’s credit grade and
the previous loan outcomes.30
In the estimation, the borrower’s default cost c takes a value from {cl, ch}; the cost of
effort θτ takes a value from {θl, θh}. All other parameters follow the assumptions imposed
in Section 4. With Θ denoting the vector of parameters identified and to be estimated, I
30I characterize the amount requested by borrowers into two groups. The means of the high and low
amount group are $13,000 and $8,700 respectively.
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construct the log-likelihood for the whole sample as follows.
LL(Θ) =
N∑
i
log(fOit,Oit−1;Θ)
=
N∑
i
log(
∑
c
fc|Xit−1,Kit−1,DCit−1 × fXit−1,Kit−1,Ait−1,DCit−1
×
∑
θit−1
fDit−1,Lit−1,Iit−1,Wit−1,rit−1,θit−1|c,Xit−1,Kit−1,Ait−1,DCit−1

× fXit|Xit−1,c × fKit|Kit−1,Dit−1,Lit−1 × fAit|Kit,Dit−1 × fDCit|c
×
[∑
θit
fDit,Lit,Iit,Wit,rit,θit|c,Xit,Kit,Ait,DCit,Dit−1,Lit−1
]
).
(5.1)
fDit−1,Lit−1,Iit−1,Wit−1,rit−1,θit−1|c,Xit−1,Kit−1,Ait−1,DCit−1 represents the joint likelihood of the bor-
rower’s observables (and θt−1) at loan t − 1. Given the conditional independence assumed
earlier, I decompose this likelihood as follows. Notice that default and late payment proba-
bilities enter the likelihood only for borrowers who participate and are funded.
fDit−1,Lit−1,Iit−1,Wit−1,rit−1,θit−1|c,Xit−1,Kit−1,Ait−1,DCit−1
=
∏
j=0,1
(
fDit−1=j|rit−1,θit−1,c
)1{Dit−1=j,Iit−1=1,Wit−1=0}
×
∏
j=0,1
(
fLit−1=j|rit−1,θit−1,c
)1{Lit−1=j,Iit−1=1,Wit−1=0}
×
∏
j=0,1
(
fIit−1=j|Wit−1=0,rit−1,Xit−1,Kit−1,Ait−1,DCit−1
)1{Iit−1=j,Wit−1=0}
×
∏
j=0,1
(
fWit−1=j|Xit−1,Kit−1,rit−1,θit−1,c
)1{Wit−1=j}
×frit−1|Xit−1,Kit−1,Ait−1,DCit−1 × fθit|c,Ait .
(5.2)
My identification strategy does not rely on the optimality conditions of the interest rate
to recover borrowers’ and lenders’ primitives. Thus, when constructing the likelihood, I am
able to treat frit−1|Xit−1,Kit−1,Ait−1,DCit−1 as an observed density from the data. To compute
fDit−1|rit−1,θit−1,c, fLit−1|rit−1,θit−1,c and fWit−1=0|Xit−1,Kit−1,rit−1,θit−1,c, borrowers’ optimal effort
levels for the first loans are required. When solving the dynamic optimization problem for
borrowers, I first compute their continuation values conditional on different observables and
past outcomes. To do this, I estimate the second loan’s interest rate distribution and the
funding probabilities nonparametrically from the data, and then compute continuation values
using Equation (3.5). By taking different future consequences into account, the borrower
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chooses his first loan’s optimal effort, which determines his participation probability and
the probabilities that defaults and late payments occur. With the optimal effort level of
borrowers conditional on different types, I can also compute the lender’s expected payoff given
the updated beliefs derived in Equation (3.13). fIit−1=1|Wit−1=0,rit−1,Xit−1,Kit−1,Ait−1,DCit−1 is
thus obtained by comparing the expected payoff with the lender’s outside option. In addition,
fθit|c,Ait are primitives to be estimated. For the borrower’s joint likelihood of observables at
loan t, a similar approach applies once I obtain the beliefs about the borrower’s type at
the time he applies for the second loan. Beliefs are updated following Equation (3.14). In
the estimation, I solve a three-period dynamic model and use the results from the first two
periods to match the data, since borrowers with more than three listings are rarely observed
in the sample.31
5.2 Results
The estimation results are shown in Table 11 with standard errors computed using a two-step
maximum likelihood variance-covariance estimator (Murphy and Topel, 2002).32 I separate
the estimates into four panels, where Panel (A) focuses on utility primitives and Panels
(B) – (D) show the estimates of probabilities of low effort cost, transition probabilities of
state variables, and the probabilities of high type. The risk-aversion parameter I get from
the estimation is around 1.5 using a CARA utility function.33 The difference between the
two categories of cost shocks is large, implying that transitory shocks are important when
borrowers make their effort choices. My estimates also show that, when defaults occur, high-
type borrowers achieve negative payoffs and low type borrowers achieve positive payoffs. If
no defaults occur, the average net revenue borrowers can get out of a loan is around 49%.
The estimates for vx and vd suggest that borrowers who have lower debt-to-income ratios
or request loans for debt consolidation are faced with worse outside options. The last two
lines of Panel (A) represent the estimated mean and variance of the lender’s outside option
distribution. My estimate of the average return is slightly lower than the risk-free rate in
the outside markets. This may be because lenders’ outside options are not restricted to
investment options.
Panel (B) in Table 11 shows that borrowers who have higher default costs or request
loans of a lower amount are more likely to draw smaller cost shocks. From Panel (C), it is
31One caveat here is that we do not know the exact T for each borrower, but my model is flexible enough
to account for more periods if borrowers with more listings are available.
32In the estimation, I normalize γ = 4.5, v¯0 = −1, and vk = 0.1.
33When computing the actual monetary value for each loan, I multiply the revenue Rh−1−rt or Rl−c by
the amount requested (divided by 105). So the risk-aversion parameter I get is essentially around 1.5×10−5,
which is within the range obtained in the literature using a CARA utility function; see Cohen and Einav
(2007).
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Figure 2: Compare the Shift of Credit Grade Distribution: Data v.s. Model
clear that when borrowers have high debt-to-income ratios, there is a high chance for them
to stay in that bad situation. Borrowers with ch are more likely to stay with low debt-to-
income ratios (about 64%). Panel (D) presents the estimates of original type distribution
given different combinations of observables. It is clear that borrowers with high credit grades
and who use the loans for debt consolidation are more likely to be “good borrowers”; that is,
they have high default cost. Conditional on different debt-to-income ratios, the proportions
of high type do not seem to vary much. In the estimation, I also allow the probability of
borrowing for debt consolidation to be correlated with borrowers’ unobserved types. I find
high type borrowers are more likely to propose loans that are used for debt-consolidation.
This result is intuitive in the sense that borrowers who are attempting to pay off existing
loans are likely to have higher default cost and may be more responsive to the dynamic
incentives imposed by the reputation system.
5.3 Model Fit
I check the model fit by comparing borrowers’ participation probabilities, lenders’ funding
probabilities, and default and late payment rates generated by the model with the ones
observed in the data. This exercise is done for borrowers with different combinations of
observables. The results are shown in Tables 12 and 13. Note that funding probabilities are
computed using listings that are not withdrawn by borrowers. Default and late payment rates
are computed for loans that are funded. In addition, I use the model and my estimates to
predict the shift of credit grade distribution across two listings and compare the results with
the patterns observed in the data. Since I classify the seven credit grades into two groups in
the empirical estimation, I reproduce the histograms in Figure 1.34 The simplified version is
provided in the left panel of Figure 2. To recap, the shift of the credit grade distribution may
34In the empirical setting, high credit groups include borrowers with credit grade AA, A and B. Other
grades are characterized as low credit group.
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occur for two reasons. First, borrowers who pay off the first loans and propose the second
listings may have higher credit grades (selection channel). An alternative explanation would
be that borrowers’ credit grades are updated after the first loan so that the distribution
shifts (update channel). One advantage of the structural model is that I can decompose
the two channels by plotting the distribution of credit grades first for all borrowers after
the first loan, and then only for borrowers that pay off their loans and are selected in the
second period. The shift of credit grade distribution under three stages is shown in the
right panel of Figure 2. It is clear from the figure that the update channel is important and
the selection channel further shifts the distribution to the right. Combining all results, my
estimates arguably match the data patterns well.
6 Counterfactual Analysis
Given that the utility primitives and the distribution of borrowers’ private information have
been recovered, I conduct three sets of counterfactuals in this section. I first compare wel-
fare under three information structures – one with types and effort observed (symmetric),
one with only types observed, and one with both unobserved (asymmetric). These counter-
factuals allow me to (1) quantify the total welfare loss from asymmetric information, and
(2) decompose the sources of inefficiency into adverse selection and moral hazard. I further
consider the factual scenario, where the market with asymmetric information is imposed
with a reputation system. By comparing the welfare gain from reputation with the total
welfare loss, I am able to quantify the extent to which efficiency is restored by the reputa-
tion system. To alleviate long-run inefficiencies induced by the reputation/feedback system,
I further study the implications of offering Payment Protection Insurance to borrowers.
For all counterfactual experiments, I assume that the website chooses the optimal interest
rate to maximize the rate of successful transaction, since it charges commission fees for
each successfully funded loans.35 I solve borrowers’ optimal effort levels, lenders’ funding
decisions and the website’s pricing rule for each market design. Table 5 presents rates of
successful transaction, borrower’s participation and lender’s funding probabilities, default
and late payment probabilities, and average utilities for borrowers and lenders under the
five market designs. A transaction occurs when a borrower participates and lenders invest.
Hence, the rate of successful transaction equals the multiplication of borrowers’ participation
rate and lenders’ funding probability for listings not withdrawn by borrowers. Default and
35The website may also be concerned about other aspects of market performance. For example, the
website may prefer to keep the overall default rate below a certain level, it may prefer to attract more
borrowers with high credit grades, etc. For this paper, I focus on the main channel through which the
website makes profit.
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Table 5: Counterfactual Results: Compare Welfare under Five Scenarios
Scenarios S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Symmetric Observe type Asy. Info. Reputation Rep.+PPI
First Loan
Rate of transaction 0.9282 0.5577 0.4657 0.9255 0.9252
Participation prob. 0.9293 0.9359 0.9329 0.9267 0.9266
Funding prob. 0.9988 0.5959 0.4992 0.9988 0.9985
Default prob. 0.1165 0.1007 0.2090 0.1563 0.1256
Late prob. 0.0302 0.0228 0.1108 0.0596 0.0505
Borrower’s avg. util. 0.2487 0.2658 0.2420 0.2497 0.2578
Lender’s avg. util. 0.0816 0.0628 0.0550 0.0801 0.0895
Second Loan
Rate of transaction 0.9186 0.5495 0.4451 0.7413 0.7676
Participation prob. 0.9198 0.9236 0.9239 0.7493 0.9249
Funding prob. 0.9987 0.5949 0.4817 0.9893 0.8299
Default prob. 0.1100 0.1007 0.2099 0.1481 0.1553
Late prob. 0.0305 0.0216 0.1178 0.0595 0.0636
Borrower’s avg. util. 0.2586 0.2722 0.2392 0.2642 0.2752
Lender’s avg. util. 0.0836 0.0619 0.0577 0.0665 0.0573
Total Surplus 0.3894 -0.3208 -0.5237 0.3444 0.3779
Note: Borrowers’ and lenders’ average utilities are computed for funded loans.
late payment rates and average utilities for borrowers and lenders are computed for funded
loans. The upper and lower panels of Table 5 show results for the first and the second loans,
respectively. Table 14 in the Appendix summarizes market outcomes and prices by type.
6.1 Welfare Loss from Asymmetric Information
I first compare the welfare of market participants under three scenarios. The first one
features symmetric information, so that the website and lenders perfectly observe and price
on borrowers’ types and effort. In the second scenario, only borrowers’ types are observed and
priced. The website has to take borrowers’ incentive constraints into account when choosing
optimal interest rates. The third one is when both types and effort are unobserved to the
website and lenders, and no other mechanisms are imposed. The difference in welfare levels
between S1 and S3 measures the total loss from asymmetric information. The difference
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between S1 and S2 is only due to unobserved effort, which quantifies the welfare loss from
moral hazard. By comparing these three market designs, I find that 22 percent of the
inefficiency from asymmetric information is due to adverse selection, and 78 percent is due
to moral hazard.
From Column 3 in Table 5, it is clear that the presence of asymmetric information leads
to an inefficient market outcome. When both types and effort are unobserved, borrowers
exert less effort and low-type borrowers are more likely to participate. This results in a
higher default rate (around 20%) and a lower funding probability (49%). Due to asymmet-
ric information, some potential good borrowers have difficulties in getting funded and the
transaction rate for the website is also low (around 46%). In the case of symmetric infor-
mation, the website and lenders perfectly observe and price on borrower’s type and effort.
Borrowers are charged with type-specific interest rates. For borrowers that have low default
cost and draw large cost shocks of exerting effort, their interest rates are around 35%, which
are very close to the upper limit set by the Usury law. On the other hand, interest rates for
good borrowers are around 10%. Under this scenario, lenders have a very high probability
to invest and the transaction rate is about 92%. When only borrower’s types are observed,
this market suffers from moral hazard. I find from the analysis that, for borrowers that have
low default costs and draw large cost shocks, the website cannot find an interest rate at
which lenders are willing to invest. In other words, the market collapses for this group of
“lemon” borrowers. The transaction rate under this scenario is 55%, higher than that in S3
but lower than that in S1. This also implies that reducing adverse selection helps to improve
market outcomes, while moral hazard still plays an important role in creating inefficiencies.
In Scenarios 1-3, borrowers have no dynamic concerns.36 The results for the first and the
second loans are very similar.
6.2 The Value of the Reputation System
I now consider the factual scenario, where the market with asymmetric information is im-
posed with a reputation system. I follow the rules imposed by Prosper.com and compute
equilibrium interest rates and beliefs about borrower’s type over time. From the experiment,
I find that 95 percent of welfare loss from asymmetric information is recovered by the rep-
utation system through the following channels. First, the reputation system helps to refine
beliefs about borrowers’ types, so that “lemon” borrowers are excluded from the market
gradually. Table 6 presents the proportion of high-type borrowers conditional on observables
36When information is symmetric, borrowers have no incentive to exert more effort in earlier periods.
When there is asymmetric information but no reputation system is imposed, lenders do not update their
beliefs based on past loan outcomes. Borrowers again have no dynamic incentives.
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Table 6: Belief of High Type Proportion
Observables Original After 1st Loan After 2nd Loan
other purpose
low dti, low credit grade 0.2335 0.4754 0.6396
high dti, low credit grade 0.2461 0.3841 0.5086
low dti, high credit grade 0.5326 0.6072 0.6811
high dti, high credit grade 0.5870 0.5202 0.5554
debt cons.
low dti, low credit grade 0.3219 0.5436 0.7016
high dti, low credit grade 0.3311 0.4517 0.5774
low dti, high credit grade 0.7320 0.6759 0.7404
high dti, high credit grade 0.7323 0.5813 0.6201
across loans. Borrowers that have defaults in the previous loans are not allowed to enter
in the future.37 This selection process makes the pool of borrowers better. Second, when
the reputation system is implemented, borrowers are incentivized to exert more effort, which
leads to a lower default rate (around 15%) and higher average utilities for lenders. Third,
from Table 14, I find that the funding rate for all types under reputation is high (99%). That
is, even low type borrowers now have access to credit, which reduces welfare loss from credit
rationing observed in S2 and S3. Given higher rate of matching (92%), the website receives
more profit when the reputation system is implemented.
I then compare the outcomes of the first and the second loans under the reputation
system. Different from the cases in Section 6.1, borrowers have dynamic concerns in this
scenario. There are two counter forces that impact outcomes in the second loans. On the
one hand, borrowers that have survived are more likely to have better types. On the other
hand, since they are closer to the final period, borrowers have less incentive to exert effort.
The lower panel of Table 5 shows that default and late payment rates are slightly lower for
second loans, which indicates that the positive effect of selection dominates the negative
effect of decreasing incentives. Another interesting point from this table is that borrowers’
participation rate in second loans under the reputation system is significantly lower than that
in first loans. This is because borrowers who have defaulted are not allowed to participate
in the second period and can only take random draws from the outside option distribution.
Some of the borrowers may be of good types but receive bad shocks. The accidental loss of
reputation prevents good borrowers from having future credit access, and thus may lead to
potential long-run inefficiencies.
37In the counterfactual analysis, I also require the reputation system to not allow borrowers with late
payments to enter again. This helps to reduce computational burden.
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6.3 Payment Protection Insurance
To address the long-term inefficiencies due to accidental loss of reputation, the last part
of my counterfactual analysis considers remedies for the welfare loss that may occur when
incorrect beliefs about borrowers’ quality persist in credit markets. In the current setting of
the website, once he defaults, the borrower loses his reputation immediately and is unable to
borrow again. However, even if borrowers have good types and exert high levels of effort, it
is still possible that they obtain unlucky draws of revenues. And if this situation accidentally
occurs, good borrowers are left with no access to future credit and beliefs about their quality
get “stuck”. This situation has strong empirical relevance, especially for small businesses that
find peer-to-peer lending an attractive financing alternative (Segal, 2015) and rely heavily
on this form of credit access for their success and growth.
In this section, I consider the policy implication of offering borrowers an option to buy
Payment Protection Insurance (PPI), which covers loan repayments for a set period of time if
borrowers are unable to make them in certain situations. These circumstances usually include
being made redundant at one’s job or not being able to work because of an accident or illness.
The intuition of this mechanism is straightforward. If a borrower wants to maintain a good
reputation (and hence credit access in the future), but also worries about future negative
shocks, he/she can purchase this insurance ex-ante to hedge against the risk.
Adding PPI to the main model in Section 3 induces some new challenges. First, I need
to model borrowers’ insurance purchase decisions and how premiums are determined by
the insurer. Second, the insurance purchase decisions affect lenders’ beliefs about borrowers’
types, and thus affecting the funding decisions and equilibrium interest rates. Now borrowers
have to also decide whether or not to purchase the insurance when making participation
decisions. If borrowers buy the insurance, they have to pay premiums at the current period,
but the insurer will cover the repayments whenever bad shocks realize. No defaults or late
payments occur for a loan that is insured. If borrowers do not have insurance, there is
a possibility that they will default or have late payments. I assume that once borrowers
default or have late payments, they are not allowed to enter again. Moreover, to simplify the
model, I assume that the website and lenders do not observe previous insurance purchase
decisions. This implies that future beliefs about borrowers’ types only depend on default or
late payment performances. Future beliefs enter into borrowers’ optimization problems with
or without insurance purchase.
I now sketch the model in which the borrower is offered an option to purchase payment
protection insurance. Consider a borrower with default cost c. At the time he applies for
loan t, lenders’ and insurers’ belief about his type is St. His expected payoff of having loan
t with insurance purchase, given interest rate rt, effort level e and cost of effort θt is defined
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in the following equation.
V˜ insB,c,t(e, St, rt, θt, B0)
=
∫ R¯
1+rt
U(R− 1− rt)dFRt|e(R|e) +
∫ 1+rt
0
U(R− c)dFRt|e(R|e)
+ δ EVB,c,t+1(St+1(St, rt, Ht = nl), rt+1, θt+1, v0,t+1)− φ(e, θt)−B0,
(6.1)
where B0 represents the premium of the insurance plan. Assume that borrowers need to pay
the default cost if they default at period T −1 even with insurance purchase, but the insurer
will cover their repayments to the lender, so that the future continuation values will not be
affected.38 The borrower decides his optimal effort level for loan t with insurance through
the following payoff maximization problem:
einsc,t (St, rt, θt, B0) = arg max
e
V˜ insB,c,t(e, St, rt, θt, B0). (6.2)
If the borrower does not purchase insurance for loan t, his expected payoff and the optimal
effort is the same as derived in Equations (3.6) and (3.7). I now construct the borrower’s
choice-specific (purchase insurance or not) value function in the following equation.
V¯ insB,c,t(St, rt, θt, B0) = max
e
V˜ insB,c,t(e, St, rt, θt, B0)
V¯ ninsB,c,t (St, rt, θt) = max
e
V˜B,c,t(e, St, rt, θt)
(6.3)
The borrower purchases the insurance whenever V¯ insB,c,t(St, rt, θt, B0) > V¯
nins
B,c,t (St, rt, θt). The
value from participation at loan t is therefore
V¯ 0B,c,t(St, rt, θt, B0) = max{V¯ insB,c,t(St, rt, θt, B0), V¯ ninsB,c,t (St, rt, θt)}.
Then following a procedure similar to that in Section 3.2.2, it is straightforward to compute
the participation probabilities and insurance purchase decisions for borrowers with each type.
I then focus on how the equilibrium premiums are decided. Assuming the insurer charges
a premium to break even, the equilibrium condition for the premium is as follows.
B0 = (1 + rt)
∑
c,θt
Pr(Dt = 1|einsc,t (St, rt, θt, B0))Pr(c, θt| par. and buy ins.). (6.4)
The RHS of Equation (6.4) represents the cost to the insurer – whenever borrowers default,
the insurer needs to cover the repayment to lenders. Note also that the insurer does not
know the exact types of borrowers who participate and purchase the insurance, so he can
38This assumption is to capture the idea that in the case when the borrower defaults, the insurer will
keep a record.
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only compute his expected cost using updated beliefs. Given future beliefs about borrowers’
types, I am able to solve borrowers’ optimal effort levels and the premium charged. In the
equilibrium, borrowers’ strategies should be consistent with the beliefs. Following procedures
similar to those discussed in Section 3, lenders make funding decisions using updated beliefs
and the website chooses the optimal interest rates.
In the last of column of Table 5, I compute market outcomes when the reputation system
is imposed with an option to purchase Payment Protection Insurance. When borrowers
have access to insurance, the risk faced by lenders is reduced, and thus their average utility
increases. From borrowers’ point of view, once they purchase the insurance, they get access
to future credit. By offering PPI, I find that borrowers have higher chance to participate in
second loans and the rate of transaction also increases. This finding highlights the effect of
this intervention on alleviating long-run inefficiencies caused by accidental loss of reputation.
This exercise also shows that only borrowers with high probabilities of being good type
purchase insurance. This is because after taking adverse selection into account, the insurer
cannot find premiums to break even for the remaining borrowers. Overall, I find providing
PPI to the market further increases the total welfare of market participants. 98 percent of
the welfare loss from asymmetric information is eliminated under this mechanism.
6.4 Impact on Market Size
To get a rough idea about the impact of different mechanisms on the size of online credit
markets, I do a simple calculation for Prosper.com. The probabilities that transactions occur
shown in Table 5 are used to approximate market sizes. Table 7 summarizes the market sizes
under different market designs. The current market size for Prosper.com is around 9 billion
dollars. If the reputation system on this market is removed, then the market size could
shrink to 4.6 billion dollars. If the market only suffers from moral hazard, the market size
is larger (5.5 $bn), but still much lower than the symmetric information scenario (9.2 $bn).
From this exercise, we can again see that the reputation system helps to restore a large
proportion of efficiency in online credit markets. Adding payment protection insurance can
further increase total welfare.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effectiveness of reputation/feedback systems in improving welfare
in online credit markets when both adverse selection and moral hazard are present. I de-
velop a finite-horizon dynamic structural model to analyze borrowers’ repayment decisions,
lenders’ investment strategies, and the website’s pricing schemes. I prove the identification
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Table 7: Market Size under Different Scenarios
Scenarios Market Size ($bn)
Symmetric Information 9.18
Reputation+PPI 9.02
Reputation (Factual) 9.00
Under Moral Hazard 5.51
Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 4.59
of the distribution of borrowers’ private types and utility primitives based on variations in
borrowers’ repayment histories, transitions of their characteristics, and interest rates, and
then estimate the model using a large transaction-level dataset from Prosper.com.
In this paper, I separate the effect of adverse selection and moral hazard, and find that
moral hazard plays an important role in online credit markets. This result has strong empir-
ical relevance, since the policy interventions that can be used to alleviate welfare loss from
adverse selection and moral hazard are very different. My result suggests that imposing
some “ex-post” monitoring mechanisms on credit markets may be more effective.
The main contribution of this paper is to quantify the welfare gain from reputation sys-
tems in online credit markets. I find that reputation matters to a large extent through
refining beliefs about borrowers’ types, incentivizing effort exertion, and expanding credit
access to low-type borrowers. These results may have implications for other settings, includ-
ing fast-growing online marketplaces that widely use review systems to facilitate transactions
and traditional credit markets that rely heavily on the credit rating system. My paper also
considers a policy intervention that protects borrowers from accidental loss of reputation. I
find that incorporating payment protection insurance into the market further improves total
welfare. This exercise is related to the optimal “forgiveness” mechanisms that are considered
in the existing credit rating system. From a methodological perspective, this paper provides
new identification strategies for empirical contract models. In a separate paper, I develop
general identification and estimation results for dynamic models with unobserved choices.
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A Existence of the Equilibrium Beliefs
In this section, I provide a sketch of the proof for the existence of equilibrium beliefs about
borrowers’ type distribution. For illustration, I simplify the model in Section 3 by keeping
only the essence of the dynamic updating process. In particular, I assume all borrowers
participate and are funded for their loans at T − 1. Moreover, I suppose there are no late
payments. Future beliefs about borrowers depend only on whether they default at T − 1.
For illustration, I consider a case in which c takes values from {cl, ch}. The belief about the
borrower’s type can be captured by st ∈ [0, 1], which represents the probability of the high
type at the beginning of each loan t. For this section, I fix the value of θt = θ¯. I also assume
the realized revenue has only two values Rh and Rl, and the probability that Rh realizes
depends on effort level e through p(e). At loan T − 1, if the borrower defaults, he obtains v¯0
at T . If the borrower pays back the loan, the probability that he is a high-type borrower is
updated.
At T − 1, the borrower’s optimization problem is as follows.
ec,T−1(sT−1, rT−1) = arg max
e
V˜B,c,T−1(e, sT−1, rT−1).
V˜B,c,T−1(e, sT−1, rT−1) = p(e)[U(Rh − 1− rT−1)
+ δ EVB,c,T (sT (sT−1, rT−1, HT−1 = nl), rT , θT , v0,T )]
+ (1− p(e)) [U(Rl − c) + δv¯0]− φ(e, θ¯).
(A.1)
Let the belief about the borrower’s type distribution at the beginning of loan T to be
s∗T = sT (sT−1, rT−1, HT−1 = nl) if he has paid off the loan at T − 1. Then essentially
the borrower’s effort level and expected payoff at loan T − 1 depends on s∗T and rT−1, i.e.
ec,T−1(s∗T , rT−1), V˜B,c,T−1(e, s
∗
T , rT−1).
The belief is formed through the Bayesian updating process.
s∗T =
p(e∗ch,T−1(s
∗
T , rT−1))sT−1
p(e∗ch,T−1(s
∗
T , rT−1))sT−1 + p(e
∗
cl,T−1(s
∗
T , rT−1))(1− sT−1)
≡ B(s∗T ). (A.2)
Equation (A.2) leads to a fixed-point problem for s∗T . To prove the existence of the equilib-
rium belief, by Brouwer’s Fixed-Point Theorem, it is sufficient to show that B(s∗T ) : [0, 1]→
[0, 1] is a continuous function.
I first prove that e∗ch,T−1(s
∗
T , rT−1) and e
∗
cl,T−1(s
∗
T , rT−1) are continuous functions of s
∗
T
by Berge’s Theorem of Maximum. Assume the support of e is bounded and closed, thus
compact. V˜B,c,T−1(e, s∗T , rT−1) is jointly continuous in e and s
∗
T . To see the continuity of
EVB,c,T (s
∗
T , rT , θT , v0,T ), note that Equation (3.10) shows that the value function is continu-
ous in the funding probability and Equation (3.13) further shows that the lender’s expected
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payoff (and hence funding probability) is a continuous function of s∗T . Then by Berge’s The-
orem of Maximum, e∗ch,T−1(s
∗
T , rT−1) and e
∗
cl,T−1(s
∗
T , rT−1) are upper hemicontinuous at s
∗
T .
I impose the following assumption to guarantee the uniqueness of the optimal effort in the
borrower’s optimization problem.
Assumption A.1 (Second Order Condition).
∂2V˜B,c,T−1(e, sT−1, rT−1)
∂e2
< 0
Since a single-valued upper-hemicontinuous correspondence must be a continuous func-
tion, e∗ch,T−1(s
∗
T , rT−1) and e
∗
cl,T−1(s
∗
T , rT−1) are continuous in s
∗
T . B(s
∗
T ) is therefore contin-
uous, since the composition of two continuous functions is also continuous.
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B Identification of the Effort Choice Probabilities
Suppose Dt, θt and Xt are all discrete random variables. Use jd = 1, · · · , Jd, jθ = 1, · · · , Jθ
and jx = 1, · · · , Jx to index the values for these three variables. I consider the case where
It = 1,Wt = 0 and the values of {rt, Kt, Ht−1, c} are fixed. To rewrite Equation (4.7) in
matrix form, I define the following matrices for Lt = 1,
MDt,Lt=1,Xt =
[
fDt,Lt=1,It=1,Wt=0|r¯t,Xt,K¯t,H¯t−1,c¯
fIt=1|Wt=0,r¯t,Xt,K¯t,H¯t−1
∣∣
Dt=jd,Xt=jx
]
jd,jx
MDt,θt =
[
fDt|r¯t,θt,c¯
∣∣
Dt=jd,θt=jθ
]
jd,jθ
Mθt,Lt=1 =diag
{[
fLt=1|r¯t,θt,c¯
∣∣
θt=jθ
]
jθ=1,2,··· ,Jθ
}
Mθt,Xt =
[
fWt=0,θt|Xt,K¯t,r¯t,c¯
∣∣
θt=jθ,Xt=jx
]
jθ,jx
.
(B.1)
The matrix form of Equation (4.7) when Lt = 1 is therefore
MDt,Lt=1,Xt = MDt,θtMθt,Lt=1Mθt,Xt . (B.2)
Similarly, when Lt = 0,
MDt,Lt=0,Xt = MDt,θtMθt,Lt=0Mθt,Xt . (B.3)
Combining Equations (B.2) and (B.3), I construct the following equations.
MDt,Lt=1,XtM
−1
Dt,Lt=0,Xt
= (MDt,θtMθt,Lt=1Mθt,Xt) (MDt,θtMθt,Lt=0Mθt,Xt)
−1
= MDt,θt
(
Mθt,Lt=1M
−1
θt,Lt=0
)
M−1Dt,θt ,
(B.4)
and
M−1Dt,Lt=1,XtMDt,Lt=0,Xt = (MDt,θtMθt,Lt=1Mθt,Xt)
−1 (MDt,θtMθt,Lt=0Mθt,Xt)
= M−1θt,Xt
(
M−1θt,Lt=1Mθt,Lt=0
)
Mθt,Xt ,
(B.5)
provided that the following assumption is satisfied:
Assumption B.1 (Invertibility). Matrices MDt,θt ,Mθt,Lt=1,Mθt,Lt=0,Mθt,Xt are invertible.
The economic intuition behind Assumption B.1 is as follows. For illustration, I consider
a case where θt ∈ {θh, θl}, Xt ∈ {X1, X2}. It is sufficient to have fDt=0|rt,θh,c < fDt=0|rt,θl,c to
ensure the invertibility of MDt,θt . This inequality implies that, conditional on receiving low
cost of effort, borrowers are more likely to pay off the debt. For Mθt,Lt=1 and Mθt,Lt=0 to be
invertible, the probability that late payment occurs must be in (0, 1). For matrix Mθt,Xt ,
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since fWt=0,θt|Xt,Kt,rt,c = fWt=0|Xt,Kt,rt,θt,c · fθt|c,
Mθt,Xt =
[
fWt=0|θh,X1,Kt,rt,c · fθh|c fWt=0|θh,X2,Kt,rt,c · fθh|c
fWt=0|θl,X1,Kt,rt,c · fθl|c fWt=0|θl,X2,Kt,rt,c · fθl|c
]
.
As a result, to achieve the invertibility of Mθt,Xt , the following inequality is required:
fWt=0|θh,X1,Kt,rt,c · fWt=0|θl,X2,Kt,rt,c 6= fWt=0|θh,X2,Kt,rt,c · fWt=0|θl,X1,Kt,rt,c,
or alternatively:
fWt=0|θh,X1,Kt,rt,c
fWt=0|θl,X1,Kt,rt,c
6= fWt=0|θh,X2,Kt,rt,c
fWt=0|θl,X2,Kt,rt,c
. (B.6)
The intuition behind this assumption is that, as the distribution of the outside option gets
better, the impact of receiving different cost draws becomes smaller, and thus the ratio of
the participation probabilities given θh and θl becomes closer to 1. For example, consider
the extreme case in which the mean of the outside option is larger than the maximum payoff
borrowers can get from the website when Xt = X2, so both types will be willing to stay
out and the ratio of their participation probabilities is 1. When the other value of Xt is
lower enough to attract borrowers to participate, the condition in Equation (B.6) holds.
With Assumption B.1 satisfied, Equations (B.4) and (B.5) lead to eigenvalue-eigenvector
decompositions of the matrices on their left hand sides. To guarantee the uniqueness of the
decomposition, I invoke the following assumption.
Assumption B.2 (Uniqueness). fLt=1|rt,θt,c increases with θt.
Theorem B.1 (Identification). In addition to the assumptions in Theorem 1, if Assumptions
B.1 and B.2 are satisfied, fDt|rt,θt,c, fLt|rt,θt,c and fWt=0,θt|Ωt,c are identified for any fixed values
of {rt, Kt, Ht−1, c}.
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C Identification of Utility Primitives in Borrower’s Pay-
off Functions
Consider the unknown parameters in V¯ 0B,c,T (rT , θT ). Explicitly,
V¯ 0B,c,T (rT , θT ) = p(ec,T (rT , θT ); β)U(Rh − 1− rt;α)
+ (1− p(ec,T (rT , θT ); β))U(Rl − c;α)− φ(ec,T (rT , θT ), θT ),
(C.1)
where ec,T (rT , θT ) is the level of optimal effort for borrowers with type c given (rT , θT ).
The level of effort enters into the payoff function through two channels: (1) it affects the
probability that high revenue Rh is realized through p(·; β) with parameter β measuring
the effectiveness of the effort; and (2) it induces cost through φ(e, θT ) = θT e
2, where θT
represents the cost of effort. In Equation (C.1), the unknowns include β, α, Rh and the
levels of c and θT .
C.1 Identification of Risk-Aversion Parameter
Using variations in observed interest rates, the following theorem identifies Rh and α.
Theorem C.1. Given two values of observed interest rate, r¯t and rˆt, α and Rh are identified.
A sketch of the proof of Theorem C.1 is as follows. With V¯ 0B,c,T (rT , θT )) recovered, its
derivative with respect to rT ,
∂V¯ 0B,c,T (rT , θT ))
∂rT
=
∂ec,T (rT , θT )
∂rT
[p′(ec,T (rT , θT ))(U(Rh − 1− rT )− U(Rl − c))− φ′(ec,T (rT , θT ))]
− p(ec,T (rT , θT ))U ′(Rh − 1− rT )
=− p(ec,T (rT , θT ))U ′(Rh − 1− rT ),
(C.2)
is also identified. Notice that the second equality in Equation (C.2) holds because ec,T (rT , θT )
satisfies the first order condition in borrower’s optimization problem. Observe also that
p(ec,T (rT , θT )) = fDT=0|rT ,θT ,c, which has been recovered from the matrix decomposition in
Section 4.2. Therefore Equation (C.2) identifies U ′(Rh − 1 − rT ). With the assumption of
CARA utility, U ′(Rh− 1− rT ) = α exp(−α(Rh− 1− rT )). With two observed interest rates
r¯T and rˆT , α is identified through the following equation
U ′(Rh − 1− r¯T )
U ′(Rh − 1− rˆT ) =
α exp(−α(Rh − 1− r¯T ))
α exp(−α(Rh − 1− rˆT )) = exp(−α(rˆT − r¯T )). (C.3)
Plugging α back to U ′(Rh − 1− rT ), Rh is identified.
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C.2 Identification of Levels of Private Information
To identify the levels of c and θt, I relate the identified default probability fDt=0|rt,θt,c to the
effort level through p(·; β).39
fDt=0|rt,θt,c = p(ec,T (rT , θT ); β) = 1− exp(−βec,T (rT , θT )). (C.4)
Equation (C.4) for c = ch, cl uniquely determines
ech,T (rT ,θT )
ecl,T (rT ,θT )
. I rearrange Equation (C.1) for
ch and cl, and construct the following two equations for θh and θl.(
ech,T (rT , θh)
ecl,T (rT , θh)
)2
=
p(ech,T (rT , θh))U(Rh − 1− rt) + (1− p(ech,T (rT , θh)))U(Rl − ch)− V¯ 0B,ch,T (rT , θh))
p(ecl,T (rT , θh))U(Rh − 1− rt) + (1− p(ecl,T (rT , θh)))U(Rl − cl)− V¯ 0B,cl,T (rT , θh)(
ech,T (rT , θl)
ecl,T (rT , θl)
)2
=
p(ech,T (rT , θl))U(Rh − 1− rt) + (1− p(ech,T (rT , θl)))U(Rl − ch)− V¯ 0B,ch,T (rT , θl)
p(ecl,T (rT , θl))U(Rh − 1− rt) + (1− p(ecl,T (rT , θl)))U(Rl − cl)− V¯ 0B,cl,T (rT , θl)
.
(C.5)
(C.5) provides a system of two linear equations of U(Rl − ch) and U(Rl − cl). To ensure
identification of levels of Rl − c, I invoke the following rank condition.40
Assumption C.1 (Rank Condition).
|∆| = −δ2(1− p1)(1− p4) + δ1(1− p2)(1− p3) 6= 0
where δ1 =
(
ech,T (rT ,θh)
ecl,T (rT ,θh)
)2
, δ2 =
(
ech,T (rT ,θl)
ecl,T (rT ,θl)
)2
, p1 = p(ech,T (rT , θh)), p2 = p(ecl,T (rT , θh)),
p3 = p(ech,T (rT , θl)), and p4 = p(ecl,T (rT , θl)).
Note that all terms in Assumption C.1 have been recovered, so the rank condition is
directly testable. This condition guarantees the unique solution of Rl − ch and Rl − cl given
the identified risk-averse parameter α. To further pin down θh and θl, it is sufficient to
normalize γ.41
39In the model, I assume that whenever Rh is realized, the borrower pays off his loan and p(e;β) represents
the probability Rh is realized given effort level e.
40The levels of Rl and c are not seprately identified, since only their difference matters in the model.
41The ratio of θh and θl can be easily recovered without knowing the exact effort level. However, since β
and θt enter the model with effort level in a non-separable way, I cannot recover all of them simultaneously.
I decide to normalize γ to pin down the levels of effort. The model then identifies β and the levels of cost
shocks for better economic interpretations.
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Tables
Table 8: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max # of Obs
# of listings 1.1197 0.3706 1 3 102,528
# of loans originated 1.0023 0.4959 0 3 102,528
term (# of months) 42.3681 11.2994 12 60 114,804
borrow for debt consolidation 0.6716 0.4696 0 1 114,804
borrow for home improvement 0.0731 0.2602 0 1 114,804
borrow for business 0.0504 0.2187 0 1 114,804
FICO score below 600 0.3058 0.4607 0 1 114,804
home owner 0.5124 0.4998 0 1 114,804
employed 0.9424 0.2329 0 1 114,804
is the borrower a group member 0.0124 0.1105 0 1 114,804
# of current credit lines 10.7388 5.2876 0 64 114,804
# of delinquencies over 30 days 3.6347 6.8248 0 99 114,804
Table 9: Regression of Amount Requested on Whether the Loan is the Second Loan
(1)
VARIABLES amount request
second loan 127.2
(91.44)
debt to income high 987.7***
(92.55)
Constant -1,372***
(268.0)
Observations 16,820
R-squared 0.250
Note: Control for Borrowers’ observables, year dummies and loan characteristics. Standard errors in
parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 10: Logit Regression of Default on Whether the First Closed Loan is Defaulted
(1)
VARIABLES default
first close loan default 5.008***
(0.139)
borrower rate 9.418***
(3.126)
amount request 3.97e-05***
(1.02e-05)
debt to income high 0.313***
(0.118)
Constant -5.475***
(0.987)
Control for Borrowers’ Char. Y
Control for Year Dummies Y
Control for Loan Char. Y
Observations 4,822
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 11: Estimation Results
Panel(A) Utility Primitives
Parameters Notations Estimates Std. Err.
Risk aversion parameter α 1.4981 0.0717
Effectiveness of effort parameter β 2.3738 0.0189
Cost of effort (low) θ1 0.0657 0.0038
Cost of effort (high) θ2 0.8090 0.0322
Default cost (high) Rl − ch -0.5321 0.0190
Default cost (low) Rl − cl 0.2370 0.0460
High revenue Rh 1.4949 0.0059
Coef. of dti ratio in b’s outside option dist. ξx 0.0027 0.0125
Coef. of loan purpose in b’s outside option dist. ξd -0.4797 0.0127
Mean of lender’s outside option µ0 0.0005 0.0010
Std. err. of lender’s outside option σ0 0.0261 0.0005
Panel(B) Probabilities of Low Cost of Effort
Conditional on Estimates Std. Err.
high type, high amount 0.8913 0.0126
high type, low amount 0.9960 0.0006
low type, high amount 0.6663 0.0123
low type, low amount 0.6734 0.0118
Panel(C) State Transition Probabilities
Parameters Estimates Std. Err.
Pr(low dti |high type, low dti) 0.6430 0.0099
Pr(high dti |high type, high dti) 0.8973 0.0089
Pr(low dti |low type, low dti) 0.4979 0.0102
Pr(high dti |low type, high dti) 0.9170 0.0079
Panel(D) Probabilities of High Type
Conditional on Estimates Std. Err.
other purpose
low dti, low credit grade 0.2335 0.0092
high dti, low credit grade 0.2461 0.0092
low dti, high credit grade 0.5326 0.0099
high dti, high credit grade 0.5870 0.0122
debt consolidation
low dti, low credit grade 0.3219 0.0095
high dti, low credit grade 0.3311 0.0094
low dti, high credit grade 0.7320 0.0099
high dti, high credit grade 0.7323 0.0110
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Table 12: Model Fit: Participation and Funding Probabilities
Observables par prob fund prob
data est data est
low amount,
other purpose
low dti, low credit grade 0.8828 0.8861 0.8945 0.8900
high dti, low credit grade 0.8967 0.8837 0.9092 0.9096
low dti, high credit grade 0.8906 0.8736 0.9529 0.9522
high dti, high credit grade 0.9179 0.8705 0.9808 0.9806
high amount,
other purpose
low dti, low credit grade 0.8984 0.9035 0.8672 0.8811
high dti, low credit grade 0.9046 0.9011 0.9103 0.9014
low dti, high credit grade 0.8726 0.8896 0.8333 0.8726
high dti, high credit grade 0.9151 0.8857 0.9297 0.9339
low amount,
debt cons.
low dti, low credit grade 0.9346 0.9540 0.9657 0.9720
high dti, low credit grade 0.9472 0.9528 0.9715 0.9780
low dti, high credit grade 0.9560 0.9472 0.9892 0.9909
high dti, high credit grade 0.9655 0.9460 0.9946 0.9930
high amount,
debt cons.
low dti, low credit grade 0.9398 0.9611 0.9664 0.9584
high dti, low credit grade 0.9557 0.9600 0.9743 0.9667
low dti, high credit grade 0.9434 0.9520 0.9484 0.9532
high dti, high credit grade 0.9565 0.9509 0.9710 0.9624
Weighted Average 0.9311 0.9314 0.9503 0.9523
Note: The funding probabilities are computed conditional on the listings are not
withdrawn by borrowers.
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Table 13: Model Fit: Default and Late Payment Probabilities
Observable default prob late prob
data est data est
low amount,
other purpose
low dti, low credit grade 0.2920 0.3284 0.1859 0.1814
high dti, low credit grade 0.3227 0.3273 0.1581 0.1815
low dti, high credit grade 0.1312 0.1793 0.0732 0.0775
high dti, high credit grade 0.1976 0.1654 0.0712 0.0696
high amount,
other purpose
low dti, low credit grade 0.3321 0.3049 0.1631 0.1616
high dti, low credit grade 0.3944 0.3039 0.1665 0.1618
low dti, high credit grade 0.1761 0.1681 0.0875 0.0702
high dti, high credit grade 0.2377 0.1552 0.0761 0.0633
low amount,
debt cons.
low dti, low credit grade 0.2844 0.2845 0.1464 0.1504
high dti, low credit grade 0.3226 0.2840 0.1228 0.1507
low dti, high credit grade 0.1240 0.1222 0.0555 0.0443
high dti, high credit grade 0.1855 0.1226 0.0529 0.0447
high amount,
debt cons.
low dti, low credit grade 0.2906 0.2643 0.1221 0.1340
high dti, low credit grade 0.3369 0.2638 0.1130 0.1343
low dti, high credit grade 0.1555 0.1158 0.0627 0.0413
high dti, high credit grade 0.1912 0.1162 0.0592 0.0416
Weighted Average 0.2470 0.2226 0.1079 0.1099
Note: The default and late payment probabilities are computed conditional on the loans
are funded.
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Table 14: Counterfactual Results: Compare Welfare by Borrowers’ Types
Scenarios Outcome Variables (θ1, cl) (θ2, cl) (θ1, ch) (θ2, ch)
S1: Symmetric
Participation prob. 0.9436 0.9093 0.9337 0.8236
Funding prob. 0.9992 0.9983 0.9991 0.9975
Default prob. 0.0936 0.3601 0.0367 0.2067
Late prob. 0.0112 0.1446 0.0019 0.0510
Borrower’s avg. util. 0.3409 0.0850 0.2679 -0.4007
Lender’s avg. util. 0.0840 0.0728 0.0839 0.0644
Avg. interest rate 0.1351 0.3546 0.1018 0.1769
S2: Observe Type
Participation prob. 0.9454 0.0000 0.9335 0.8198
Funding prob. 0.3796 0.0000 0.9991 0.9970
Default prob. 0.2783 N/A 0.0437 0.2540
Late prob. 0.0886 N/A 0.0027 0.0760
Borrower’s avg. util. 0.3768 N/A 0.2647 -0.3942
Lender’s avg. util. -0.0065 N/A 0.0831 0.0676
Avg. interest rate 0.1481 N/A 0.1054 0.1988
S3: Asy. Info.
Participation prob. 0.9437 0.9400 0.9262 0.8310
Funding prob. 0.4984 0.4984 0.4984 0.4984
Default prob. 0.3167 0.7904 0.0449 0.2470
Late prob. 0.1138 0.6406 0.0029 0.0719
Borrower’s avg. util. 0.3605 0.3521 0.2142 0.1436
Lender’s avg. util. -0.0097 -0.2174 0.1378 0.1346
Avg. interest rate 0.1775 0.1777 0.1783 0.1742
S4: Reputation
Participation prob. 0.9374 0.9150 0.9245 0.8148
Fund prob. 0.9987 0.9987 0.9987 0.9987
Default prob. 0.1219 0.5100 0.0416 0.2228
Late prob. 0.0186 0.2794 0.0025 0.0589
Borrower’s avg. util. 0.3137 0.2893 0.2203 0.1451
Lender’s avg. util. 0.1085 -0.1064 0.1307 0.1053
Avg. interest rate 0.1837 0.1833 0.1604 0.1516
S5: Rep. + PPI
Participation prob. 0.9387 0.9216 0.9249 0.8200
Insurance purchase prob. 0.3273 0.3273 0.3273 0.3273
Funding prob. — w/ ins. 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Funding prob. — w/o ins. 0.9980 0.9980 0.9980 0.9980
Default prob. — w/o ins. 0.1293 0.5311 0.0434 0.2304
Late prob. — w/o ins. 0.0207 0.3016 0.0027 0.0626
Borrower’s avg. util. 0.3187 0.3068 0.2279 0.1547
Lender’s avg. util. 0.1154 -0.0633 0.1352 0.1067
Avg. interest rate 0.1820 0.1820 0.1479 0.1330
Note: (1) Borrowers’ and lenders’ average utilities and interest rates are computed for funded loans. (2)
Default and late payment probabilities are computed conditional on the loans are funded. Under the case
where only types are observed by lenders, borrowers with (θ2, cl) are not funded, so default and late
payment probabilities are N/A. 53
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Figure 3: Growth of Peer-to-Peer Lending Markets
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Figure 4: An Example of a Listing
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Figure 5: The Histograms of Borrowers’ Stated Monthly Income
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